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Abstract 
 South Korea is often renowned in the comparative education field for its students’ high 
scores on international assessments, regarded as a success story and a role model. Despite this, 
the Korean education system has multiple issues: high rates of mental health issues among 
students, differences in educational opportunities determined by socioeconomic disparities, and a 
large shadow education industry. Since the beginning of the modern Korean education system in 
the 1950s, policymakers have utilized varying types of reforms in order to mitigate these issues 
by attempting to find a balance between educational equity and quality. This paper analyzes the 
patterns of these reforms from multiple perspectives and assesses their success to generate 
insight about the complexity of the issues as well as possible alternative approaches to policy 
reform. It details the history of Korean education reform and the responses of scholars to this 
history to demonstrate that neither the Korean government nor academic experts have been able 
to reach a consensus about the most effective form of policy for providing quality education for 
all students. It also explores other countries’ responses to similar problems to provide further 
insight and explore alternative policy approaches. The findings in this paper suggest that South 
Korea may be unable to achieve further success in balancing educational equity and quality 
without making significant changes to the high stakes exam-oriented structure of the education 
system itself. 
Keywords: South Korean education policy; access and quality in education; private tutoring; 
shadow education
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I. Introduction 
 In the comparative education field, South Korea (hereafter referred to as Korea for 
brevity) is often looked to as a model country. Its education system is widely regarded as a 
success, and this is no surprise given its enrollment rates and international testing scores. During 
the second half of the twentieth century, government efforts to expand access to education have 
resulted in enrollment rates that have been high for decades. For example, in 2016 net enrollment 
rates for primary and secondary education were both above 96%.1 Furthermore, Korean students 
score consistently high on international tests like the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) and the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has remarked that “ever 
since the PISA assessment was launched in 2000, Korea has remained at or near the top of 
international assessments of student learning”.2 In the 2015 PISA, Korean 15-year-olds ranked 
eleventh place in the science section and seventh place in the reading and mathematics sections 
out of the 72 participating countries.3 It had a 25.6% share of top performers in at least one 
subject and a 7.7% share of low achievers in all three subjects, compared to the OECD averages 
of 15.3% and 13.0% respectively.4 In the 2015 TIMSS, Korean eighth grade students ranked 
second place in the mathematics section and fourth place in the science section out of the 57 
participating countries. Fourth grade students ranked third place in the mathematics section and 
second place in the science section.5 With scores like these, it makes sense that other countries 
would use Korea and its educational policy as a role model in hopes of emulating its success on 
                                                
1 “Republic of Korea,” UNESCO Institute of Statistics, n.d. 
2 OECD, “Lessons from PISA for Korea” (OECD Publishing, 2014), 32. 
3 “PISA 2015 Results (Volume I): Excellence and Equity in Education,” OECD Publishing (Paris: OECD, 2016). 2 OECD, “Lessons from PISA for Kor a” (OECD Publish g, 2014), 32. 
3 “PISA 2015 Results (Volume I): Excellence and Equity in Education,” OECD Publishing (Paris: OECD, 2016). 
4 “PISA 2015 Results in Focus,” 2018. 
5 “TIMSS 2015 International Results in Mathematics,” TIMSS & PIRLS International Study Center, 2016; “TIMSS 
2015 International Results in Science,” TIMSS & PIRLS International Study Center, 2016, 
http://timssandpirls.bc.edu/timss2015/international-results/timss-2015/science/student-achievement/. 
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international assessments. 
 However, there are some growing issues beneath the surface of Korea’s education system 
that suggest that there may still be room for policy improvement. These issues are rooted in the 
extremely competitive nature of the Korean education system, often called “education fever”, 
which has been discussed at length in the literature.6 Although the more structural origins of 
education fever are debatable, it is clear that it stems from a perception that educational 
attainment is the primary mechanism for upward socioeconomic mobility. However, the effects 
of Korea’s education system on student wellbeing must be seriously questioned as many students 
exhibit depressive symptoms, sometimes as extreme as suicidal ideation or attempt, as a result of 
academic stress. Furthermore, socioeconomic inequalities in educational access and academic 
performance are increasing, and these inequalities often manifest in terms of access to private 
tutoring, an already common and increasingly popular service in Korea. The following chapter 
will go into further depth on the topics of education fever, poor student wellbeing, 
socioeconomic disparities in education, and the role of private tutoring. 
This paper asks two central questions. First, how has the Korean government attempted 
to mitigate these problems of socioeconomic disparity in educational achievement and 
opportunity, and poor educational quality in terms of student wellbeing? In other words, how has 
the Korean government tried to achieve both educational equity and quality through policy? 
During the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the Korean government has implemented 
                                                
6 For more information on education fever and its origins, see Jeong-kyu Lee, “Educational Fever and South Korean 
Higher Education,” Revista Electronica de Investigacion Educativa 8, no. 1 (2006): 1–14; Nam-Hwa Kang and 
Miyoung Hong, “Achieving Excellence in Teacher Workforce and Equity in Learning Opportunities in South 
Korea,” Educational Researcher 37, no. 4 (2008): 200–207; Sunwoo Shin and Myung-sook Koh, “Korean 
Education in Cultural Context,” Essays in Education 14, no. June (2005); Jung Cheol Shin, “Higher Education 
Development in Korea: Western University Ideas, Confucian Tradition, and Economic Development,” Higher 
Education 64 (2012): 59–72; Clark W. Sorensen, “Success and Education in South Korea,” Comparative Education 
Review 38, no. 1 (1994): 10–35; So Jin Park, “Education Manager Mothers: South Korea’s Neoliberal 
Transformation,” Korea Journal 47, no. 3 (2007): 186–213. 
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different types of education policies, some placing a priority on improving equitable access to 
education, others prioritizing quality in education. Using these different approaches, the 
government has attempted to respond to some of the prevailing problems in the education system 
that will be discussed in the next chapter. Despite these efforts, students and their families still 
face these problems today. This leads into the second central question this paper asks: what 
explains the persistence of these problems? In attempting to answer this, I begin to address a 
third and related question: what are the root causes of the problems the Korean government is 
attempting to improve? To answer these questions, I will analyze the Korean government’s past 
and current education policies from different perspectives in order to assess how successful they 
were in terms of improving equal access, quality, and student wellbeing. I will explore the 
history of the actual policies, and then review the literature’s response to them, before using a 
comparative approach with other countries’ policies. I will also turn particular attention to 
regulation policy of private tutoring because it is a major piece of the Korean education 
experience and the Korean government has expressed an interest in reducing its prevalence for 
decades. Thus, I will also ask if the regulation of private tutoring is a worthwhile policy goal and 
if so, what forms of regulation might be most effective.  
Asking these questions and looking for their answers may provide important insight that 
can improve the lives of Korean students. Although Korean students score very well on exams, 
they express frustration and dissatisfaction with their education. The English teachers who run 
the website Korean Students Speak share images of students who hold up pieces of paper with 
whatever they choose to write in English.7 Among the professions of love for pop singers and the 
“Never give up!” lines, there are many images of students holding up signs that say things like 
“We are school’s slaves!”, “Student is not [sic] studying machine”, and “Korean education kills 
                                                
7 “Korean Students Speak,” accessed May 5, 2019, https://koreanstudentsspeak.tumblr.com/. 
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students”. There are countless signs of students expressing their desire to sleep, some wanting to 
sleep “at 10 P.M.”, or “at least 7 hours every day.” In a 2016 interview about preparing for 
college admissions, high school student Yu Si-yeol said his experience “really brought home that 
all the talk about ‘equality of opportunity’ in South Korea is just empty sloganeering.”8 These are 
just a few examples of Korean students sharing their opinions about their education system.  
 
Figure 1: A student holding a self-made sign that reads “I don’t like Korean education policy. Students are exhausted.” 
(Image by “Korean Students Speak”, accessed May 5, 2019, https://koreanstudentsspeak.tumblr.com/.) 
From a scholarly perspective, better understanding Korean education reforms can extend 
our knowledge about education reform. Understanding both the successes and the shortcomings 
of particular reforms can generate insight into what works and what does not for achieving 
equity and quality. This paper in particular adds to the existing literature on this topic by placing 
                                                
8 Myeong-seon Jin, “For Prestigious University Admission, S. Korean Students and Parents in a War for 
Information,” Hankyoreh, March 21, 2016. 
  
5 
particular emphasis on how policy tries to improve student wellbeing, which has often not been 
addressed. It will draw attention to the role that student wellbeing has in discussions of equity 
and quality and demonstrate the relative inattention to it in much of the policy in Korea and some 
other countries.  
Due to a lack of time and resources, I could not conduct primary research for this paper. 
Most appropriate Korean language sources on the topic were also unavailable. Due to the scope 
of this paper, I was also unable to address every education policy implemented by the Korean 
government. Nevertheless, I provide an extensive history of reform related to issues of access 
and quality. I am thus able to produce relevant findings about Korean education policy by 
analyzing the existing English language literature’s responses to it and reviewing other countries’ 
responses to similar problems.  
I. A. Access and Quality in Education 
 To have a discussion about Korean education policy, it is necessary to have first a 
discussion about access and quality in education. These two issues and their interaction are 
relevant to all education systems and a frequent topic in the field of education development. The 
rest of this introduction will be devoted to discussing this education policy issue on a broad scale 
before delving into the specifics of the Korean education system. 
 The most basic definition of access in terms of education refers to the number and 
location of schools, the number of grade levels, and the availability of opportunity to advance to 
higher grade levels. In other words, level of access indicates how many desks are available for 
students, for how many years, and where these desks are located.9 However, this definition of 
access does not adequately address some issues of inequality in education. Daniel Sifuna 
                                                
9 Helen Geissinger, “Girls’ Access to Education in a Developing Country,” Compare 27, no. 3 (1997): 289, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0305792970270305. 
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provides a more complex understanding of access that takes into account equality—or lack 
thereof—in terms of “supply, demand, and the learning process.”10 Supply refers to the 
availability and quality of schools and the accompanying facilities and resources. Demand refers 
to “parental decisions based on the opportunity cost of schooling”, which can be based on 
cultural or family-specific factors.11 The learning process refers to students’ experience in 
school, such as the curriculum or relationships with teachers and classmates. Inequality of access 
can exist in any of these aspects of education and disadvantage certain groups of students. 
Education policymakers with the intention of improving access need to keep in mind the various 
places that inequality can emerge in the system. 
 In contrast to access, quality of education is much more subjective. According to 
UNESCO, there are two common strands that appear in most attempts to define quality. The first 
strand states that a system’s quality is determined by its students’ cognitive development as this 
is considered a central objective of all education systems. This type of quality is easier to 
measure quantitatively. Under this school of thought, education systems are often evaluated by 
indicators such as students’ literacy and numeracy rates. The second strand “emphasizes 
education’s role in promoting values and attitudes of responsible citizenship and in nurturing 
creative and emotional development” of students.12 These values tend to include things like 
peace and equality as well as more culturally specific values and traditions. This type of quality 
is much harder to measure and evaluate quantitatively. In an attempt to combine these two 
common strands, UNESCO has adopted a conceptualization of education—and thus, educational 
quality—based on four pillars: learning to know, learning to do, learning to live together, and 
                                                
10 Daniel N. Sifuna, “The Challenge of Increasing Access and Improving Quality: An Analysis of Universal Primary 
Education Interventions in Kenya and Tanzania since the 1970s,” International Review of Education 53 (2007): 688, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11159-007-9062-z. 
11 Sifuna, 688–89. 
12 “2005 EFA Global Monitoring Report Education for All: The Quality Imperative,” 2004, 17. 
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learning to be. These pillars address building knowledge, applying that knowledge practically, 
coexisting with equal opportunity and without discrimination, and developing individual skills to 
reach one’s full potential, respectively.13 An education system that facilitates the achievement of 
these four pillars is considered high quality. 
 UNESCO’s conceptualization of educational quality is a good attempt to integrate two 
common definitions of quality. However, I argue that its definition of educational quality is 
partially lacking because of its overemphasis on the outcomes of an education. In order to fully 
evaluate the quality of an education system, it is necessary to examine its effects on students both 
during and after their time within the system. The definition of educational quality should 
emphasize, or at the very least include, student wellbeing. Wellbeing, like quality, is a difficult 
concept to define due to its subjectivity. However, most understandings of wellbeing are holistic 
and “include personal, cognitive, affective, social, physical, psychological, moral, and spiritual 
dimensions.”14 A student’s school life plays a significant role in his or her wellbeing. A range of 
factors including school facilities, relevance of the curriculum, teacher support, and student 
agency influences student wellbeing. For example, research has indicated that learning-oriented 
academic goals increase students’ perceptions of wellbeing, as opposed to achievement-oriented 
goals.15 Students in a high quality education system should enjoy learning and their education 
should contribute to their wellbeing, not detract from it. The system should not harm students’ 
physical or mental health; furthermore, it should provide resources for students who suffer from 
health problems.  
                                                
13 “2005 EFA Global Monitoring Report Education for All: The Quality Imperative,” 30. 
14 Neville Clement, “Student Wellbeing at School: The Actualization of Values in Education,” in International 
Research Handbook on Values Education and Student Wellbeing, ed. Terence Lovat, Ron Toomey, and Neville 
Clement (Berlin: Springer, 2010), 38. 
15 Nadine Engels et al., “Factors Which Influence the Well-Being of Pupils in Flemish Secondary Schools,” 
Educational Studies 30, no. 2 (2004): 139, https://doi.org/10.1080/0305569032000159787. 
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 High levels of access and quality are undoubtedly both essential features of an education 
system that benefits its students. However, the relationship between the two varies depending on 
one’s approach. From the perspective of government budgeting, access and quality often appear 
at odds with one another. Particularly in developing countries, decreased quality of school 
facilities and resources such as teachers and textbooks may be seen as an inevitable consequence 
to achieving wider access to education due to limited funding. In contrast, others view access and 
quality as two features of an education system that often overlap. For example, a low teacher-to-
student ratio is both a matter of access and quality, as it relates to students’ access to educators, 
as well as the quality of attention educators can give any one student. In addition, equitable 
access is often subsumed under the definition of quality. UNESCO argues that an education 
system cannot improve qualitatively without expanding its access.16 A system that cannot 
provide equitable access to all students is not a high-quality system because it is a discriminatory 
system. Ideally, policymakers should design education policies that can improve access and 
quality simultaneously. 
 The following chapters will situate the Korean educational system within the discussion 
of balancing access and quality. In Chapter II, I discuss in more detail the general structure of the 
Korean education system as it fits into Korean society, as well as the issues in the system that 
need to be addressed. In Chapter III, I provide a history of past and current Korean education 
policy beginning in the middle of the twentieth century, noting general trends in the goals and 
methods of these policies. Chapter IV is a review of how scholars in the literature on Korean 
education policy analyze and evaluate the different types of policy the Korean government has 
employed, with a focus on the division between scholars who support neoliberal education 
policies and those who oppose them. In Chapter V, I review other countries’ attempts at policies 
                                                
16 “2005 EFA Global Monitoring Report Education for All: The Quality Imperative,” 16. 
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that balance educational equity and excellence. Chapter VI concludes the paper and provides 
some tentative policy recommendations. 
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II. Background on the Korean Education System and its Issues 
II. A. The Education System within Korean Society 
Korea’s current education system and its function in Korean society is the result of a 
unique set of circumstances that Korea experienced during the twentieth century. Up until the 
Japanese occupation of Korea in 1910, Korean society was governed by a strict class structure 
that restricted access to education to the uppermost classes.17 After Japanese colonization and the 
Korean War, the old class structure was destroyed. By rendering much of the population of 
Korea equally poor, these events created an essentially leveled society, except for a group of 
elites that surrounded authoritarian dictator Syngman Rhee, the president put in place by the U.S. 
in 1948 after the end of Japanese colonization. During the 1960s, education became the primary 
method by which those who were not in this group of elites could achieve upward social 
mobility. Government policies developed and expanded education that stemmed from a 
“practical need to train an efficient workforce.”18 This provided opportunities for Koreans to 
educate themselves and become employed. Hagen Koo describes the majority of the Korean 
people during this time as “a society with an exceptional degree of egalitarian ethic and intense 
desire for social mobility.”19 
As the Korean population became more educated, the government pushed policies for 
industrialization. This led to urbanization and the rise of an urban middle class made up of 
                                                
17 Japan’s occupation of Korea began in 1910, but Japanese attempts to exercise control over Korea during this time 
period had already begun in the late nineteenth century. Korea became a Japanese protectorate in 1905 before 
becoming a colony in 1910. 
18 Sorensen, “Success and Education in South Korea,” 14; Hagen Koo, “The Changing Faces of Inequality in South 
Korea in the Age of Globalization,” Korean Studies 31 (2007): 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1353/ks.2008.0018. 
19 Hagen Koo, “The South Korean Stratification System: Continuity and Change,” in Modern South Korean Society: 
Its Development and Prospect, ed. Hyuk-Rae Kim and Bok Song (Berkeley: University of California Center for 
South Korean Studies, 2007), 41 in Doo Hwan Kim and Yool Choi, “The Irony of the Unchecked Growth of Higher 
Education in South Korea: Crystallization of Class Cleavages and Intensifying Status Competition,” Development 
and Society 44, no. 3 (2015): 439. 
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educated Koreans who were able to accumulate wealth.20 Around this time, as the middle class 
began to use their new resources to provide more educational opportunities for their children, 
access to educational resources became increasingly competitive. Secondary schools 
implemented entrance exams and were ranked by their scores, creating uneven demand as 
parents tried to send their children to the most prestigious primary and secondary schools. 
During this time, private tutoring began to see increased demand for the first time.21 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, as competition and inequality in the education 
system heightened, the Korean government attempted to use policy to balance “between the 
social mobility desire of the South Korean population and both state and popular equalitarian 
ideologies.”22 The authoritarian governments of Park Chunghee (1961-1979) and Chun 
Doohwan (1980-1988) put equalization policies in place to maintain a broad social base by 
appealing to the general public and checking the affluent classes.23 This implies that the middle 
and upper classes, although growing, did not hold enough power to sway the state and influence 
its policies during this period. This dynamic began to change in 1987 with the democratization of 
Korea, when class divisions deepened and exacerbated the conflict between social mobility 
desire and equalitarian ideologies. Democratization simultaneously empowered the working 
class’s demands for socioeconomic equality and the new middle class’s lobbying for policies that 
                                                
20 Kim and Choi, “The Irony of the Unchecked Growth of Higher Education in South Korea: Crystallization of Class 
Cleavages and Intensifying Status Competition.” 
21 Sunwoong Kim and Ju-Ho Lee, “Changing Facets of Korean Higher Education: Market Competition and the Role 
of the State,” Higher Education 52 (2006): 557–87, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-005-1044-0; Sunwoong Kim and 
Ju‐Ho Lee, “Private Tutoring and Demand for Education in South Korea,” Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 58, no. 2 (2010): 259–96, https://doi.org/10.1086/648186. 
22 So Jin Park and Nancy Abelmann, “Class and Cosmopolitan Striving: Mothers’ Management of English 
Education in South Korea,” Anthropological Quarterly 77, no. 4 (2004): 648, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/anq.2004.0063. 
23 Sang Young Park, “Crafting and Dismantling the Egalitarian Social Contract: The Changing State-Society 
Relations in Globalizing Korea,” Pacific Review 23, no. 5 (2010): 579–601, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2010.522247. 
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allowed them to solidify and further advance their high socioeconomic standing.24 This would 
come to affect education policy in ways that will be addressed in the next chapter. 
An overarching problem with Korean education is that it is still seen as the primary 
mechanism for socioeconomic mobility in a meritocratic Korean society. “Education fever”, a 
term often used to describe the apparent obsession with education in Korea, stems from this idea 
that education is the golden ticket to success. Families continue to devote large chunks of their 
income to giving their children the best education that they can afford, in the hopes that they will 
be better off than their parents. This causes extremely high pressure for students to perform and 
has created an intense atmosphere of competition. For middle and high school students, the 
ultimate goal used to be to score well on the college entrance exam and gain admission to a high-
ranking university. More recently, only two out of ten students enter university based on their 
college entrance exam score, and rural and private universities almost never accept students by 
their entrance exam score.25 Most universities now use comprehensive student record screening 
in the admissions process, with “extracurricular activities like clubs, volunteering, career 
building, and outside reading counted as major factors.”26 Although the admissions process 
varies widely by university, the three main factors are students’ school records, letters of 
recommendation, and the college entrance exam score.27 As a result, students are stretched thin 
trying to compete in all of these categories used in the admissions process. Although the 
importance of the entrance exam has much decreased, students still feel pressure to perform well 
on the entrance exam and school exams, along with extracurricular activities, as everything will 
be considered during the admissions process. 
                                                
24 Kim and Choi, “The Irony of the Unchecked Growth of Higher Education in South Korea: Crystallization of Class 
Cleavages and Intensifying Status Competition.” 
25 Hyun-bin Kim, “Public to Decide on College Admissions Reform,” Korea Times, May 23, 2018. 
26 Jin, “For Prestigious University Admission, S. Korean Students and Parents in a War for Information.” 
27 Se-hwan Bak, “Teacher Letters Become a Headache for All,” Korea Herald, February 26, 2017. 
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All Korean universities are ranked according to many factors, including the average 
minimum score of applicants on the college entrance examination, the employment rate of 
graduates, staff and facilities, and curricula.28 Only 2% of students are admitted to the top three 
universities.29 The strict hierarchy creates large disparities, as those who attended top-ranking 
universities have much more social capital than others. College graduates’ social prestige is tied 
to the ranking of their alma mater for the rest of their lives.30 Academic attainment often 
determines occupation, social position, income, and marriage. A survey conducted by the Korean 
Educational Development Institute (KEDI) found that “41.7% of the [lower school level] 
graduates responded that they did not receive a desirable treatment in South Korea society.”31 A 
diploma from a university, particularly a high-ranking university, is much more important than 
individual ability when seeking employment. Regardless of skill, pay will be higher for 
university graduates than for high school graduates.32 “Academic cliquism” based on one’s alma 
mater has “become a major type of social stratification in South Korean society”, particularly in 
business settings.33 Lee and Brinton’s analysis of the 1992 Survey on Employment Experiences 
of University Graduates reveals that the combination of academic cliquism and the highly 
stratified tertiary education system creates a job market where university-specific “institutional 
social capital” is much more effective for gaining employment if one has attended a prestigious 
university. 
But the Korea of today is not the same country as the Korea of the 1960s and 1970s, and 
                                                
28 Sunhwa Lee and Mary C Brinton, “Elite Education and Social Capital: The Case of South Korea,” Sociology of 
Education 69, no. 3 (1996): 177–92; Min-sik Yoon, “College Evaluations to Focus on Quality,” Korea Herald, 
September 30, 2014. 
29 Crystal Tai, “Why South Koreans Are Trapped in a Lifetime of Study,” South China Morning Post, November 15, 
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it is certainly not some kind of meritocratic utopia where the brightest and most determined 
always succeed. Economic and social inequalities exist based on gender, age, geography, 
income, and wages. Most relevant to this paper are disparities in geography, income and wages, 
as well as the role of large business groups called chaebols.  
The Korean War destroyed much of the wealth of the affluent in Korean society, leaving 
Korean society poor but somewhat equal. Then, during the first few decades of its rapid 
economic growth, Korea managed to keep income inequality at a minimum as the labor market 
shifted from mostly low-paying agricultural work to mostly higher-paying industrial work. It was 
not until the late 1990s that the distribution of income began to widen as the labor market again 
shifted to a post-industrial economy with lower-paying service jobs. Since then, the Gini 
coefficient and the relative poverty rate have risen (See Figure 1). According to the OECD, the 
Gini coefficient for market income has risen from 0.266 in 1990 to 0.313 in 2011, and the Gini 
coefficient for disposable income has risen from 0.256 in 1990 to 0.289 in 2011. The relative 
poverty rate for market income rose from 7.8% in 1990 to 15% in 2011, and the rate for 
disposable income rose from 7.1% in 1990 to 12.4% in 2011.34 According to Statistics Korea, the 
Gini coefficient had risen to 0.353 for market income and 0.304 for disposable income in 2016 
(See Figure 2). The relative poverty rate had risen to 19.5% for market income and 14.7% for 
disposable income in 2016 (See Figure 3).35 
                                                
34 OECD, “Promoting Social Cohesion in Korea,” in OECD Economic Surveys: Korea 2012 (Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 2012), 112, https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-kor-2012-en. 
35 Statistics Korea, “Income Distribution Indicators in 2016,” 2017. 
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Figure 2: Korean Gini coefficient and relative poverty rate 1990-2011. (Graph by OECD. In "Promoting Social Cohesion 
in Korea." In OECD Economic Surveys: Korea 2012, 111-45. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012, 112. 
https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-kor-2012-en.) 
 
Figure 3: Korean Gini coefficient 2006-2016. (Graph by Statistics Korea in "Income Distribution Indicators in 2016," 
2017.) 
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Figure 4: Korean relative poverty rate 2006-2016. (Graph by Statistics Korea in "Income Distribution Indicators in 
2016," 2017.) 
Another significant causal factor of the inequality is labor market dualism, which has 
resulted in a large wage gap between regular and non-regular workers. In general, wage 
inequality is high and increasing, as “workers in the bottom 10% of the income distribution have 
seen virtually no wage growth during the past two decades,” but the labor market dualism has 
exacerbated the issue (See Figure 4).36 As competition has intensified among companies in 
Korea, companies increasingly hire “fixed-term, part-time and atypical workers”, generally 
referred to as non-regular workers, in an attempt to reduce costs.37 In 2010, temporary workers 
accounted for 24.8% of total employment in Korea, the fourth highest percentage in the OECD; 
more than one-third of non-regular workers in Korea are temporary workers.38 Non-regular 
workers usually receive low wages and lack stable employment and job security. They also 
usually do not benefit from social welfare or labor policies. In 2010, “non-regular workers were 
                                                
36 OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Korea 2018 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018), 13, www.oecd.org/eco/surveys. 
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paid only 53% as much as regular workers per hour.”39 The poverty rate is also higher for non-
regular workers: 13.5% for temporary workers and 26.3% for day labors in 2009, in comparison 
to 1.5% for regular workers.40 The inequality between regular and non-regular workers is 
compounded by the difficulty of transitioning from non-regular to regular employment. 
 
Figure 5: Wage inequality is high and increasing in Korea, ratio of the 90th percentile to the 10th percentile. (Graph by 
OECD in OECD Economic Surveys: Korea 2018. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018, 13. www.oecd.org/eco/surveys.) 
In addition to a post-industrial economy and labor market dualism, chaebols also play a 
role in income and wage disparities. Chaebols are large family-owned business groups that were 
given preferential treatment by the government during Korea’s development during the twentieth 
century. These conglomerates were essential to Korea’s rapid economic growth, but also created 
an oligopolistic market in which small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) find it difficult to 
survive. Although their share of total national sales has lessened slightly, chaebols still 
represented 32% of total national sales in 2018. They account for significant portions of the 
manufacturing, mining, and service industries. According to the OECD, “the largest groups, 
Samsung, Hyundai Motor, SK and LG, had an average of 70 companies in 2017 and accounted 
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for nearly half of stock market capitalization.”41 
Not only do chaebols make it more difficult for SMEs to survive in the market, their 
wealth has been shared less and less by the rest of Korean society. As the chaebol have 
internationalized and transitioned increasingly to capital and technology-intensive industries, 
they employ fewer people and require higher-level skills. In 2017, the top 30 chaebols 
“accounted for only 2.7% of employment”.42 Most Korean people vie for a job at one of these 
chaebols, considered better paid, more secure, and more prestigious, but few manage it because 
of the increasingly limited positions available. 
Little English language academic literature is available that addresses the direct 
relationship between socioeconomic differences and urban-rural disparities in Korea. It seems to 
be taken for granted that “urbanicity tends to be positively correlated with socioeconomic 
status”.43 However, there are two related variables that suggest rural areas are socioeconomically 
disadvantaged relative to cities: regionalism and elderly poverty. 
Regionalism is an influential factor in the disparities between urban, industrial areas and 
rural, agricultural areas. Regionalism has been a factor in Korean politics and development since 
Park Chunghee’s developmental state in the 1960s. The capitol city of Seoul and the southeast 
region of Korea have been the most industrialized areas since Japanese colonization. Park’s 
economic growth plans favored further development in areas that had already begun to 
industrialize, thus favoring Seoul and the southeast. These areas became more prosperous than 
the rest of Korea, in particular the southwest region, which remained the most rural 
                                                
41 OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Korea 2018, 74. 
42 OECD, 74. 
43 Soojeong Lee and Roger C. Shouse, “The Impact of Prestige Orientation on Shadow Education in South Korea,” 
Sociology of Education 84, no. 3 (2011): 215, https://doi.org/10.1177/0038040711411278. 
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agricultural.44 
After democratization, regionalism in politics, including in economic and distributive 
policy-making, continued. A 2008 study found that incumbent presidents grant financial benefits 
to regions where they have widespread support and regions where their rivals have support. 
Swing areas where the vote is more evenly divided tend to receive less benefits. The study found 
this to be true for the Kim Youngsam (1993-1997) and the Kim Daejung (1998-2002) 
administrations, supported by the southeast region and the southwest region respectively.45 
Although more recent presidencies have not been tested to see if they exhibit the same patterns, 
the effects of past regionalism are still apparent today. In 2017, “gross regional domestic product 
(GRDP) per capita, gross regional income per capita, private consumption per capita, and 
personal income per capita were all higher than the average for the nation” in Seoul and Ulsan.46 
Ulsan is an industrial powerhouse city in the southeast region. 
In addition to regionalism, the aging population of rural areas implies a socioeconomic 
disadvantage. This is because elderly poverty is a well-documented phenomenon in Korea. As of 
2011, 50% of the Korean population aged 65 and over live in relative poverty, the highest 
percentage in the OECD.47 Urban flight has resulted in a sparsely populated countryside, with 
only 18.5% of the total population living in rural areas as of 2017, in comparison to 72.3% of the 
population in 1960.48 As young people moved to work in the cities, the elderly often remained in 
rural areas. From 1960 to 2000, the proportion of the population aged 65 and over increased from 
                                                
44 Bae-Gyoon Park, “Territorialized Party Politics and the Politics of Local Ecomomic Development: State-Led 
Industrialization and Political Regionalism in South Korea,” Political Geography 22 (2003): 811–39, 
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46 Statistics Korea, “Regional Income in 2017 (Preliminary),” 2018, 
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4.2% in rural areas to 14.7%, in comparison to an increase of only 2.5% to 5.4% in urban areas. 
This indicates that the rate of increase of the elderly population in rural areas is higher.49 In 2017, 
Jeonnam and Jeonbuk, two provinces of the southwest region, accounted for the highest 
proportions of the elderly population, at 22.0% and 19.0% respectively. This suggests that rural 
communities, with aging populations, face economic disadvantages. 
 Today, education increasingly acts to reinforce existing socioeconomic disparities, 
instead of minimizing them. Socioeconomic disparity influences the amount of and quality of 
education available to lower-income and rural families, and in turn one’s education significantly 
impacts one’s job prospects. How this increasing socioeconomic inequality interacts with the 
education system will be addressed in more detail in the following section. 
II. B. Issues of the Korean Education System 
The growing socioeconomic divide in the realm of educational access and academic 
performance is an increasing cause for concern. Students from lower income families tend to 
have less access to private education and to perform worse academically. Soo-young Byun and 
Kyung-keun Kim’s statistical analysis of data on Korean eighth graders in 1999, 2003, and 2007 
from the TIMSS database provide evidence of this divide.50 Their results reveal that “the 
influence of SES [socioeconomic status] explained approximately 13% of the variance in math 
performance in 1999, whereas it explained approximately 17% in 2003 and 2007”.51 This 
inequality disadvantages students of lower socioeconomic status doubly: not only are they denied 
their right to equal opportunity for education, their low socioeconomic status is reinforced for 
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50 Soo-yong Byun and Kyung-keun Kim, “Educational Inequality in South Korea: The Widening Socioeconomic 
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themselves and for future generations because in Korean society, education is considered the 
primary means to upward socioeconomic mobility. This demonstrates that education has become 
not just a visible example of existing socioeconomic inequality in Korean society, but a 
compounding factor for exacerbating it. 
 
Figure 6: Trends in the Relationship between Socioeconomic Background and Student Achievement in South Korea and 
the United States. Sources: TIMSS 1999, 2003, and 2007. (Graph by Soo-yong Byun and Kyung-keun Kim in 
"Educational Inequality in South Korea: The Widening Socioeconomic Gap in Student Achievement.” Research in 
Sociology of Education 17 (2010), 176. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1479-3539(2010)0000017008.) 
This problem of the Korean education system may often be overlooked because of its 
students’ relatively high scores when compared on an international scale. Figure 5 from Byun 
and Kim’s study demonstrates this phenomenon. When compared to other countries like the U.S., 
Korean students in general score very well; even Korean students at the bottom of the 
socioeconomic status (SES) distribution score about the same as U.S. students at the top of the 
SES distribution. However, the increasing slope of the Korean math achievement line of the 
2007 cohort as compared to the 1999 and 2003 cohorts demonstrates a “widening socioeconomic 
gap in student achievement”, whereas the slope of the U.S. achievement line is relatively stable 
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across cohorts.52 
 In this discussion of socioeconomic difference, the relevance of private education must 
be noted. Private education and government policy in reaction to it will be discussed at length in 
this paper because they are such a significant part of the Korean education system and contribute 
to its overall effect on student wellbeing. Private education in Korea primarily takes the form of 
private tutoring, as opposed to private schooling. To avoid confusion while discussing the 
Korean education system, the term formal schooling is used to refer to both public and private 
schools in this paper unless otherwise specified. Public and private schools operate very 
similarly; the government regulates curricula, textbooks, teachers, and so on, for both systems.53 
Except for a small group of private high schools called autonomous schools, private schools 
receive public funding. The primary difference of private schools is that their teachers are not 
required to rotate among schools, as public school teachers are required to do. Around 13% of 
primary and secondary schools in Korea are private, most at the secondary school level.54 The 
terms private tutoring or shadow education refers to for-profit supplementary education outside 
of school. The three most common types of private tutoring in order of relative cost from most 
expensive to least are one-on-one or group tutoring, private after-school academies, and 
worksheets delivered to the home. 
 Private tutoring has been gaining popularity in Korea since the 1960s and is now an 
immense industry, used primarily for enrichment rather than remedial education.55 Students 
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spend a great deal of their time outside of school receiving private tutoring, often attending 
multiple private academies at a time, to the point that leisure time is neglected and sleep is 
sacrificed.56 Previously, a great deal of time in academies was spent preparing for the entrance 
exam, as well as school exams. Nowadays, students attend private academies not only to prepare 
for these exams, but also to receive consulting services for the comprehensive student record 
screening. Some of these academies offer “student record programs” that help with reading, 
study skills, and extracurriculars. These programs “include everything from drafting student 
records to preparing for intramural competitions and writing short research papers,” as well as 
preparing statements of purpose.57 Some students pay counselors at these academies to 
ghostwrite recommendations. These recommendations are supposed to be written by teachers, 
but the teachers often allow students to write their own letters. Too busy studying for school 
exams and the entrance exam, students pay the private academies instead.58 Wealthy parents with 
the time and resources trade information and work together to draft “curricula” of private 
academies their children should attend.59 
The Korea Statistics report on private education expenditures for 2017 demonstrates 
increases across the board in terms of total expenditures on private education, participation rates, 
and participation time.60 In these reports, the Korean government classifies the types of private 
education as one-on-one tutoring, group tutoring, taking lessons at private academic institutes, 
textbooks with tutor’s visit, and Internet and correspondence lectures. 70.5% of students, almost 
three-quarters of the Korean student population, participated in private education in 2017, which 
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increased 2.7% from 67.8% in 2016. The total private education expenditures for primary and 
secondary school students in 2017 reached ₩18.6 trillion (Korean won) [US$16.6 billion], an 
increase of 3.1% from 2016. Expenditures have dropped from a range of ₩20 to 22 trillion 
[US$17.8 to 19.6 billion] between 2007 and 2011, to a range of ₩18 to 19 trillion [US$16 to 
16.9 billion] between 2012 and 2017, but the number of students has continuously decreased 
from 7.73 million in 2007 to 5.73 million in 2017, indicating that expenditures per student has 
increased overall. Average expenditures on private education per month per student increased by 
5.9% from ₩256 thousand [US$228] in 2016 to ₩271 thousand [US$241] in 2017. At 18.4%, 
the largest share of students receiving private education was paying ₩500 thousand [US$445] or 
more per month. From 2013 to 2017, the average number of hours per week participating in 
private education per student has hovered around 6 hours, peaking at 6.1 hours in 2017. Private 
education expenditures also consume a large portion of education spending as a whole, 
accounting for 1.8% of GDP in 2010, “representing 7.9% of average household disposable 
income”.61 
 Furthermore, access to private education in Korea is not equitable. Studies have shown 
that higher income families participate more in and spend more on private education, which 
indicates that the private tutoring industry is a significant medium of socioeconomic inequalities 
in the education system. Analysis of data from the 1997 Survey on Private Tutoring by the Korea 
Institute for Consumer Protection and the 1998 Urban Household Expenditure Survey by the 
National Statistical Office of Korea reveal that higher income households participate in higher 
levels of private education.62 More recently, Statistics Korea reported that in 2017, households in 
the highest income bracket participated the most in private education at 83.6%, in comparison to 
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a 43.1% participation rate of the lowest income bracket. The highest income households (₩7 
million and up per month/US$6229) also spent the most on private education, a monthly average 
of ₩455 thousand [US$405], in comparison to ₩93 thousand [US$83] a month by the lowest 
income households (less than ₩2 million per month/US$1780).63 These patterns reinforce the 
educational opportunity gap between high-income and low-income students. In addition, while 
higher income households are more likely to spend more on private education, Kim and Lee’s 
study also estimates the income elasticity of private tutoring to be about 0.5, “which implies that 
lower-income households spend a higher percentage of their income on private tutoring than do 
high-income households”.64 This inelasticity of private education indicates a compounding factor 
of increasing socioeconomic inequalities in Korea. The public’s continued perception of 
education as a tool for social mobility despite its decreasing utility has further exacerbated 
financial strains on families of low socioeconomic status. Because these families still desire 
upward class mobility, they continue to utilize private education, albeit not of the quality or 
quantity that wealthier families can afford. This results in the majority of the student population 
participating in private tutoring and lower-income families spending a larger piece of their 
income on their children’s education than upper-income families, putting significant financial 
strains on those lower-income families and students.65 
 Rural students are at a disadvantage in terms of educational access, both as a result of 
socioeconomic disparities and the smaller presence of private academies in rural areas.66 Rural 
students participate in shadow education at lower rates, and also spend less on it. In 2017, the 
participation rate in private education in towns and townships was the lowest among 
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classifications at 61.7%, in comparison to 70.9% in metropolitan cities, 71.1% in cities, and 
76.7% in Seoul. Similarly, towns and townships had the lowest average monthly expenditures 
per student on private education (₩177 thousand or US$156), compared to the highest average 
expenditures of ₩390 thousand (US$343) in Seoul.67 Rural students have poor access to many 
educational opportunities because their communities lack the resources. These communities 
often do not have the funds to provide educational resources, and the dwindling youth population 
in rural areas means they often lack significant demand for them as well. Differences in shadow 
education participation may also be because more educational opportunities are available and 
academic competition is more intense in cities. Urban citizens may feel more pressure to 
participate, and rural families concerned about their child’s education may move to the city to 
have better educational access.68 
In addition to socioeconomic inequality, high stress caused by the intense competition in 
education is perhaps the most well known problem Korean students face. Rates of dissatisfaction 
with school life, high stress levels, depression and depressive symptoms, and suicidal ideation 
and suicide are distressingly high among Korean students. Numerous surveys have demonstrated 
that school and academics are a major source of stress for students. In a 2016 study of children’s 
subjective quality of life conducted by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, Korean 
children scored very poorly on educational wellbeing, “a standardized measure of both 
satisfaction with school life and academic stress…with a score of 84.92, ranking only above 
Greece” among 30 countries surveyed.69  This study reported that academic stress was the most 
significant factor on children’s subjective wellbeing, having a negative influence.70 A 2013 study 
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found that the average sleep time of a Korean high school student is five hours and 27 minutes, 
which is an hour less than it was four years before in 2009. It also found that academic problems 
were reported to be the cause of 69.3% of students’ stress, and most worryingly, 36.9% of 
middle and high school students reported contemplating suicide in the past year and 40.4% of 
those students attributed this to their grades.71 In 2017, Statistics Korea, the country’s national 
statistics office, reported that suicide has been the leading cause of death for Korean youth ages 9 
to 24 since 2007.72 A 2002 survey of 922 adolescents reported that ages 17 to 18, around the age 
when students take the all-important college entrance exam, is a peak time for suicide attempts, 
with 16.9% of respondents in that age group reporting an attempt.73  The data from these surveys 
suggests that the mental health and wellbeing of many Korean students is in jeopardy, and is 
often related to academic concerns. 
 Student wellbeing and mental health issues, socioeconomic inequality and educational 
opportunity gap, and the role that the private tutoring industry plays in reinforcing these 
problems are the focus of this thesis. In order to understand viable solutions, it is important to 
bear in mind what the Korean government has already tried. The Korean government has 
attempted to address these issues utilizing various policies during the second half of the twentieth 
century and into the twenty-first. The next chapter will detail the history of these policies. 
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III. A History of Korean Education Policy 
This chapter will provide a history of Korean education policy since the mid to late 1940s 
with the goal of understanding how policymakers have attempted to balance excellence and 
equity in the Korean school system. In general, most of the policies implemented by the Korean 
government over the years can be classified as either equity-oriented or neoliberal policy. 
Equity-oriented policies aim to provide all students with the same educational opportunities 
regardless of social class, economic status, ability level, or other factors. Education is seen as a 
public good that should be both provided and dictated by the government. Neoliberal policy 
refers to policies that encourage privatization of goods and services formerly provided by the 
public sector as well as the deregulation of private producers’ behavior.74 Neoliberal policy does 
not consider “redistribution based on nonmarket criteria” a priority, because the market is 
considered the “most democratic and efficient solution”.75 Neoliberal education reforms 
commonly deregulate and marketize the education sector, encouraging student-as-consumer 
choice and interschool competition. In other words, it introduces a “competitive market approach 
to the allocation of [educational] resources” with the aim of achieving higher levels of efficiency 
and equality in education by requiring schools to compete for high-performing students.76 
Ultimately, the policies of the Korean government seem to reflect a push-and-pull mechanism in 
the education system: those trying to alleviate student stress, financial burden, and 
socioeconomic disparities seek to limit shadow education and equalize schools. In response, 
proponents of consumer choice and enriching, differentiated education push for fewer limitations 
on private tutoring and more autonomy for schools and students. 
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Figure 7: Summary table of policy reforms 
Policy Year Function(s) 
Education Law 1949 • Established a single-track education system with 
6 years of primary school, 3 years of middle 
school, and three years of high school 
• Established the right to education 
• Established free and compulsory primary 
education 
Middle School Equalization 
Policy (MSEP) 
1968 • Abolished middle school entrance exam and 
randomized middle school assignments within 
districts 
• Converted elite middle schools to general high 
schools 
High School Equalization 
Policy (HSEP) 
1974 • Abolished high school entrance exam and 
randomized high school assignments within 
districts 
• Reduced college autonomy 
• Banned tracking of students and schools 
• Set up inter-district teacher rotation system 
• Subsidized private schools 
7.30 Educational Reform 
Measure 
1980 • Abolished individual college entrance exam 
• Established a standardized national college 
entrance exam 
• Accredited more private tertiary schools and 
increased college admissions quotas 
• Banned private tutoring 
• Created Education Broadcast System (EBS) 
5.31 Education Reform 
Proposal 
1995-1997 • Created the Seventh Curriculum which 
encouraged more student autonomy 
• Allowed parents and teachers to have larger 
roles in decision-making at schools 
• Allowed colleges to consider students’ extended 
high school records in the admissions process 
• Reinstated tracking in math and English 
• Expanded the Special Purpose High School 
(SPHS) Program 
Educational Plans for the 
Reduction of Shadow 
Education Cost through the 
Normalization of Public 
Education 
2004 • Provided public after-school and online learning 
programs for low-income and rural students 
• Limited high school choice 
• Introduced a special admissions process that 
relies on various evaluation criteria and did not 
require an entrance exam score 
• Allowed college more autonomy in deciding 
admissions criteria 
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• Introduced an admissions officer system 
School Liberation Plan 2009 • Privatized some national universities 
• Deregulated the admissions process of colleges 
and elite schools and reduced the weight of 
entrance exam scores in the admissions process 
• Expanded the admissions officer system 
• Reinforced tracking of students in math and 
English 
• Increased school diversity by opening 
specialized schools 
• Expanded public after-school and online 
learning programs 
300 Project for Diversified 
High Schools 
2009 • Opened 300 specialized high schools, including 
88 public boarding schools and 100 
Independent Private High Schools 
Revised National 
Curriculum 
2015 • Revised the national curriculum to encourage 
creative thinking and student autonomy 
• Established the Free Semester Program (FSP) 
 
III. A. 1940s and 1950s: Rebuilding the Education System 
The Korean education system, like many other aspects of Korean society, was in ruins 
after Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula ended in 1945. With the Koreas split into two 
at this time, South Korea had to rebuild its own education system essentially from the ground up. 
The Ministry of Education (MOE) was founded in 1948 to govern the national education system. 
The MOE put forth the 1949 Education Law that established a single-track education system 
with six years of primary education, three years of middle school and three years of high school, 
and four years of tertiary education. This law declared that every Korean citizen “shall have a 
right to learn through life and to receive an education according to his/her abilities and 
aptitudes.”77 In addition, primary education became free and compulsory under this law. To enter 
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secondary school, applicants had to take standard national admission tests and pay tuition and 
fees.78 
The government used funds from an education tax and foreign aid first to build schools in 
the early stages of expansion in the 1950s, and then later to renovate existing schools and 
provide textbooks while continuing to build new schools.79 As a result of the Korean 
government’s “low-cost approach” that prioritized educational expansion and affordability over 
school quality, universal elementary education was achieved by 1959. However, this approach 
also resulted in “overcrowded classrooms, double or even triple shifts in classrooms, and low 
teacher pay”.80 Focusing primarily on universal enrollment is reasonable within the context of a 
newly rebuilt education system, but it also resulted in significant variance in the quality of 
schools, which subsequent education policy tried to remedy. 
 
III. B. 1960s and 1970s: Expanding Access and Equalization Efforts 
Following the universalization of primary education, demand for secondary education in 
the 1960s began to rise faster than government expansion of school facilities. This marks the 
point at which Korea’s education system began to become increasingly competitive. As 
mentioned previously, quality of education varied from school to school and access to secondary 
education was limited by entrance exams. These conditions contributed to a “well-established 
ranking system among secondary schools and colleges” that caused the heated competition in 
Korean society to gain admission to the highest-ranking schools.81 A school was ranked based on 
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the average minimum score of its applicants on the entrance exam.82 Entrance into a higher-
ranked middle school almost guaranteed entrance into a higher-ranked high school, which would 
allow the student social mobility and success in employment.83 Thus competition was heightened 
not only by a shortage of secondary schools, but also because of this ranking system. Because of 
this competition and desire to perform well on exams, use of private tutoring increased in tandem 
with demand for secondary and tertiary education. The Chosun Ilbo, a major newspaper in 
Korea, reported in 1967 that about 90% of Seoul sixth grade (the last year of primary school) 
students were receiving private tutoring.84 Although this statistic demonstrates that most families 
were participating in the shadow education market regardless of economic standing, more 
affluent families had access to more and higher-quality options.85  
Intense competition and financial strain to provide the best-possible educational 
opportunities resulted in high levels of stress among students and their families. This situation 
was referred to as “examination hell”, because it centered on the entrance exams for secondary 
school. To combat this issue, the MOE would enact policies throughout the 1960s and 1970s that 
aimed to level the playing field for students of lower socioeconomic status and reduce 
competition. The first of these policies was the 1968 Middle School Equalization Policy 
(MSEP). This policy abolished the entrance exam for middle school and randomized 
assignments to middle schools within districts. The elite highest-rank middle schools were 
converted to general high schools, essentially removing the existence of elite middle schools.86 
                                                
82 Sunhwa Lee and Mary C. Brinton, “Elite Education and Social Capital: The Case of South Korea,” Sociology of 
Education 69, no. 3 (1996): 181–82. 
83 Lee and Brinton. 
84 Lee and Brinton, 582. 
85 Lee and Brinton, 582. 
86 Chong Jae Lee, Heesook Lee, and Hyo Min Jang, “The History of Policy Responses to Shadow Education in 
South Korea: Implications for the next Cycle of Policy Responses,” Asia Pacific Education Review 11, no. 1 (2010): 
97–108, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12564-009-9064-6; Park, “Crafting and Dismantling the Egalitarian Social 
Contract: The Changing State-Society Relations in Globalizing Korea.” 
  
33 
This policy was enacted first in large cities and then nationwide by 1971, and raised to 90% the 
number of primary school graduates who advanced to middle school.87 For comparison, the 
advancement rate for primary school students in 1965 was 54.3%.88 
Although the MSEP successfully reduced competition surrounding middle school 
admissions, education fever simply redirected to high school admissions. The problem was 
replicated at the next stage of education. Like with the previous universalization of primary 
education, which led to increased demand for middle school education, the increased and 
equalized access to middle school led to higher demand for high school education. The inability 
of the supply side to meet this demand due to insufficient school facilities, in combination with 
variations in school quality, further facilitated the hierarchical ranking of high schools. In the 
1960s and early 1970s, “only 40% of middle school graduates were able to enter high schools 
due to a lack of school facilities”.89 The shadow education industry continued to thrive as a result 
of the competition surrounding high school admissions. In response, the MOE created the 1974 
High School Equalization Policy (HSEP). Most importantly, this policy removed the entrance 
exams for high school. It also “included such measures as randomizing high school assignments; 
reducing the autonomy of colleges; and…banning the tracking of students and schools”.90 
Furthermore, it set up a rotation of teachers within school districts and subsidies for private 
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schools.91 These features of the policy were designated to “equalize or level school inputs—such 
as operating expenditures, student intake, class size, and education facilities—across schools.”92 
The HSEP was the policy that made private schools functionally similar to public schools, 
prohibiting private schools from selecting their students and equalizing public and private 
tuitions.93 
 
III. C. 1980s and 1990s: Policy Directly Targeting Private Tutoring and a Turn toward 
Neoliberal Policy 
Although the MSEP and HSEP did reduce competition surrounding secondary education, 
the continued existence of individual college entrance exams and the hierarchical ranking system 
of universities fueled education fever and the shadow education industry. Previously, the MOE 
had enacted policy shaping the formal education system in an effort to control the shadow 
education system. Beginning in the 1980s, the MOE not only altered the formal education system 
to control shadow education, but also began to directly target the private tutoring industry itself.  
In 1980, the MOE established the July 30th or 7.30 Educational Reform Measure, also 
known as the “Measures for Educational Normalization and the Elimination of Excessive Private 
Tutoring”. This policy abolished individual college entrance exams, replacing them with a 
standardized national exam, accredited more private tertiary institutions, and increased college 
admissions quotas by allowing “universities to accept 30% more students than their graduation 
quota”.94 This caused college enrollment to grow by more than 2.5 times from 1980 to 1990.95 
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The 7.30 Educational Reform Measure also placed an outright ban of private tutoring. 
Throughout the early 1980s, revisions of the legislation behind the ban made it even stricter. 
Although people did break this law to illegally provide and receive private tutoring, they risked 
harsh punishment: “The students who were caught…were subject to severe disciplinary 
measures including suspension and disadvantages in grading at school; their parents were raided 
by the National Tax Service and were given disadvantages in promotion at work; illegal private 
instructors and tutors were either arrested or fired”.96 These punishments may sound unusually 
severe; at the time, this was not unusual because the authoritarian dictator Chun Doohwan 
governed Korea. In addition, the television channel the Education Broadcast System (EBS) was 
created and began to provide “low-cost supplementary TV-based tutoring programmes” as an 
alternative to shadow education.97  
By the 1990s, Korea had transitioned to a democratic regime and it also began to shift its 
policy toward neoliberalism and globalization in many sectors. This shift included education 
policy, and was framed as an attempt to improve the quality and diversity of schools. Firstly, the 
private tutoring ban was “gradually relaxed throughout the 1990s”.98 Rather than continuing to 
rigorously control the shadow education market, the Korean government again turned primarily 
to improving formal education in the hopes of diverting demand from private tutoring. However, 
with neoliberal ideology providing a guiding set of values for policy, the government did not 
prioritize stemming competition. Instead, the discourse around policy focused on consumer 
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choice, diversity, and school and student autonomy.99 
 From 1995 to 1997, the newly launched Presidential Commission on Education Reform 
(PCER) created the New Education System, also referred to as the May 31st or 5.31 Education 
Reform Proposal.100 Firstly, the policy reform tried to introduce more differentiation and 
autonomy in multiple areas. It included the Seventh Curriculum (the seventh revisal of the 
national curriculum), which instated a more differentiated curriculum and encouraged more 
student choice and autonomy. The 5.31 reform also allowed parents and teachers to have larger 
roles in “decision-making process on school matters,” providing more interschool 
differentiation.101 It also diversified criteria for student evaluation in secondary school as well as 
for student selection in the college admissions process.102 Colleges could now use a combination 
of the entrance exam, students’ high school grade point average (GPA), as well as a test 
administered by the college, and they had some flexibility over the assigned weight of each item 
in the admissions process. Beginning in 1997, colleges were allowed to look at extended high 
school records, “including personal information, academic records, attendance records, and 
award-winning records.”103 However, at this time “colleges relied heavily on the [entrance exam] 
score for screening.”104 
Two more controversial aspects of the New Education System were the reinstatement of 
tracking and the diversification of school type through the expansion and decentralization of the 
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Special Purpose High School (SPHS) Program. The Seventh Curriculum implemented tracking 
of students in mathematics and English based on skill level and focus of study.105 For example, 
students in their last two years of high school were placed into Mathematics I, Mathematics I or 
II, and Practical Mathematics according to whether they were on the Literary Track, Science 
Track, or Vocational Track, respectively.106 The SPHS Program was intended to counteract what 
critics of the HSEP claimed were “downward leveling effects” of the MOE’s equalization 
policies by allowing for specialized schools in science, foreign languages, arts, and sports, as 
well as independent private schools and international schools.107 The HSEP did not apply to 
SPHS, so these schools were able to control their operations and student selection. As a result, 
SPHS could be very selective in their admissions process and came to be seen as elite schools, 
essentially replacing the elite schools of the 1960s and 1970s that the HSEP had eliminated. 
Furthermore, the number of SPHS grew markedly when the program was decentralized from 
MOE authority, permitting local education authorities to open a SPHS. From 1990 to 2000, the 
number of SPHS rose from 25 to 68. By 2008 there were 102, and in 2018 there were 157 
SPHS.108 
Also as a part of the general move toward neoliberal values of consumer choice and 
competitiveness, various regions and large cities began to abolish or loosen the HSEP. This trend 
would continue into the twenty-first century. For example, in 1996 students in Seoul were 
allowed to apply to specific schools they chose in a “common catchment area”, although 
“beginning in 2010, they were further permitted to apply to schools outside their designed 
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catchment area”.109 In addition, the HSEP is no longer applied in most smaller cities and rural 
areas.110 As of 2006, around half of students were in school districts under the HSEP.111 
In 1997, the MOE created the “Educational Plans for Alleviating Overheated Private 
Tutoring and Reducing Household Spending on Shadow Education” in response to complaints in 
society about the financial strains private tutoring placed on families. This move implied that the 
Korean government increasingly viewed shadow education not as something that could be 
entirely stamped out, but instead something that the government should try to manage by 
improving the formal schooling system.112  
 
III. D. 2000s and 2010s: Education Policy Reflects Push-and-Pull Nature of the Education 
Debate 
In the twenty-first century, Korean education policy has continued in a neoliberal 
direction for the most part. However, some policies have resisted this neoliberal trend in an effort 
to improve student wellbeing or to control shadow education. That being said, policy 
concentrated on student wellbeing or control of shadow education does not necessarily contradict 
neoliberal values. In particular, supporters of neoliberal education policy have emphasized the 
importance of differentiated curricula and educational choice that can better provide individual 
students with the kind of education most suitable for them.  
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For example, in 2002, the Constitutional Court ruled the private tutoring ban 
unconstitutional for violating families’ and students’ right to learn as guaranteed to them in the 
Framework Act on Education. Although the private tutoring ban was removed, the government 
has since placed limitations on the price of private after-school academies (hagwon) and a 10 PM 
curfew on hagwon in five regions in Korea beginning in 2006.113 Then, in 2010, as a result of 
backlash when some local governments refused to enforce the curfew, the central government 
decided that each city and provincial education office should set its own curfew. This resulted in 
differing regional curfews that lack any legal force, some running as late as 12 AM.114 
Presidents Roh Moohyun (2002-2007) and Lee Myungbak (2008-2013) both attempted to 
reduce demand for—and thus the financial burden of—private tutoring by improving the formal 
school system, although their approaches were somewhat different. The differences in their 
approaches can be summed up by comparing the titles of the educational plans they released: the 
Roh administration published in 2004 the “Educational Plans for the Reduction of Shadow 
Education Cost through the Normalization of Public Education”, while the Lee administration 
published in 2009 the “Educational Policies for the Reduction of Shadow Education through the 
Enhancement of the Competitiveness of Public Education”.115 Roh’s educational policy included 
goals of providing alternatives to private tutoring for students from families of lower 
socioeconomic status or living in rural areas, such as public after-school programs or online 
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learning programs.116 Certain after-school programs had participation rates rise from 43% after 
their introduction in 2006 to 65% in 2011, with higher rates for low-income and rural students.117 
Roh also expanded the EBS, creating supplementary programs connected to the Internet.118 
Roh’s educational policy also allowed only limited high school choice, and made the 
college admissions process more holistic, with more importance given to high school records and 
somewhat less importance given to the entrance exam.119 Moreover, a “special” admissions 
process that did not require an entrance exam score was introduced at this time and instead 
utilized items like a recommendation from the high school principal, an essay exam, an interview, 
or a university-conducted test.120 Colleges could no longer administer their own tests of students’ 
cognitive abilities, but they could determine how they used and weighted students’ 
comprehensive high school record in admissions. They could also require a statement of purpose, 
an interview, an essay, or an aptitude test. Roh also introduced an admissions officer system in 
2004, in which admissions officers who know the high school curricula and rankings select 
students according to their grades, potential, skills, and background.121 However, at this time 
many colleges still “relied heavily on the [entrance exam] score because it was a common 
measure and an easy one,” and because many high schools sometimes exaggerated students’ 
records to improve their chances of admission.122 Along with supporting the continued use of the 
HSEP, Roh also suppressed the expansion of the SPHS beginning in 2007 by requiring that 
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“local education authorities should begin to ‘consult’ with the government regarding the 
establishment of new SPHS in their regions.”123 Roh even considered entirely eliminating the 
SPHS, but eventually chose not to as a result of backlash from SPHS program supporters. 
In contrast, Lee Myungbak’s administration led to a renewed focus on neoliberal 
development of the formal education system. These neoliberal policies were attempts to lessen 
expenditures on shadow education by diversifying and improving schools and regaining the 
favor of middle-class parents who had “deemed public education insufficient” for their children’s 
needs and turned instead to private tutoring.124 Lee’s policies also deregulated primary and 
secondary education, handing over much of the authority to local education offices. Lee’s School 
Liberation Plan and the 300 Project for Diversified High Schools “are associated with the 
following policies: privatizing national universities, expanding the number of elite high schools, 
deregulating the admission procedures of colleges and elite schools, and reinforcing the tracking 
of students in math and English” after determining student performance in a national student 
achievement test that had previously been abolished.125 For example, at this time, the MOE 
encouraged splitting classes into three groups based on their English language ability. As a 
result, in 2009, 77.2% of middle schools and 79.6% of high schools were tracking students.126 
More specifically, the 300 Project for Diversified High Schools was a plan to open 300 
specialized high schools, “including 88 public boarding schools and 100 Independent Private 
High Schools.”127 The Lee administration also increased school diversity by creating 
autonomous schools, international middle schools, vocational magnet schools, and Meister 
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schools, a type of vocational school that prepares students for the industrial sector.128 Like the 
Roh administration, Lee’s education policy expanded public after-school and online learning 
programs, and encouraged assigning less weight to exam scores and more to school records and 
GPA for SPHS, independent private high schools, and college admissions processes.129 Lee also 
expanded the admissions officers program introduced by Roh and “actively encouraged” 
colleges to use this method.130 In 2010, the government announced that the EBS’s preparation 
materials for the college entrance exam would have a 70% linkage rate with the actual exam 
questions, so that students could theoretically study only with low-cost EBS materials, instead of 
shadow education.131 Research suggests that although EBS TV lectures are not very effective at 
improving entrance exam scores, they have reduced shadow education expenditures, especially 
for low-income or rural students.132 
After the election of Park Geunhye in 2013, the MOE put forth a Revised National 
Curriculum in 2015, which is to be fully implemented by 2020. The primary goal of this 
curriculum is to “cultivate a ‘creative and integrative learner,’” moving away from teaching 
methods that encourage rote memorization and toward those that encourage flexible and creative 
thinking and class participation.133 Notably, the 2015 Revised National Curriculum places more 
emphasis not only on student autonomy through the implementation of “creative experiential 
activities”, but also more directly acknowledges the high stress levels of students as a result of 
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academic pressures.134 It does so primarily by way of the Exam-free Semester, also known as the 
Free Semester Program (FSP). The FSP is a semester during middle school in which students do 
not take any standardized, paper and pencil exams. During this semester, students also have more 
flexibility to choose their own studies, and can participate in more self-directed, experiential 
learning. The MOE indicates in the 2015 Revised Curriculum that “schools should collaborate 
with local communities to offer experience-based activities such as career-exploration activities, 
selective theme activities, club activities, arts/physical activities, and so forth” for students.135 
The FSP is intended to improve student wellbeing by reducing student stress and providing for 
more enjoyment in the learning process. 
The MOE also announced in 2015 the development of a student suicide prevention phone 
application that monitors students’ social media posts for content related to suicide and alerts the 
parents if it finds anything. The use of this app is completely optional.136 
With the election of Moon Jae-in in 2017, the future of education policy in Korea remains 
uncertain. Moon has made promises to expand education policy that alleviates academic stress 
for students, as well as promises to break from the current neoliberal policy trend and return to 
the trend of school equalization that prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s. Whether or not Moon will 
be able to make good on all of his promises without receiving significant backlash is as yet 
unclear; however, if he is successful the Korean education system will undergo considerable 
changes. The Moon administration has already started to set deadlines for policy changes. In 
2018, the MOE announced that universities will be required to admit a minimum of 30% of their 
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new students based on their entrance exam scores by 2022. This will primarily affect schools in 
Seoul, where there is a high concentration of the highest-ranked schools, as many schools outside 
of Seoul already meet this requirement. The MOE stated that “the policy, however, will not 
apply to specialized universities like Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology or 
two-year colleges.”137 At the same time, the MOE also announced that more subjects on the 
entrance exam will be graded absolutely instead of on a curve by 2022 to lower the stakes: a 
second foreign language and Chinese characters, along with English and national history, which 
have been graded absolutely since 2017. Moon wants to re-expand “regular admissions” that 
primarily use the entrance exam scores, as opposed to the special admissions that rely on 
students’ GPA and school reports.138 He has pledged to “simplify college admissions to reflect 
the students’ school transcripts, grades, and test scores” because he believes that the numerous 
ways to apply and get admitted to university are increasing demands for private tutoring.139 
Following the government’s plan for the 2022 college admissions reform, a workshop of parents, 
teachers, and education experts will determine four or five reform models that will then be voted 
on by a 400-member civic participation group. However, the head of the Presidential Committee 
on National Education has said that “it is nearly impossible to select a reform standard that suits 
all universities in the nation as they all have different procedures in admitting students.”140 
In addition, Moon has shown intentions to do away with any form of hierarchy in high 
schools, universities, and the job market. He plans to convert all SPHS to regular high schools. 
He also has announced intentions to integrate all state universities in order to eliminate the strict 
hierarchy of school rankings. Universities will act as a network in recruiting and graduating 
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students, and students and professors will be able to take and teach courses at any school. This 
network will also eventually collaborate with private universities. Moon also submitted a bill to 
the National Assembly for a law that will ban putting academic background on resumes. Finally, 
Moon has stated that he plans to uphold current education policies that encourage student 
autonomy in the learning process by expanding the FSP in middle schools and “enabling [high 
school] students to select the classes they wish to take, as university students do.”141 
 
III. E. Discussion 
 The timeline of education policy in Korea has revealed a back-and-forth progression of 
policy direction between equity-oriented and neoliberal policy. After a few decades of focus on 
equitable expansion of access, concerns about the quality of education were addressed by 
neoliberal policies beginning in the 1990s. One casual factor of this neoliberal shift appears to be 
the rising influence of the upper and middle classes, as well as neoliberal politicians, after the 
democratization of Korea in the early 1990s. Although Roh Moohyun made a significant return 
toward equity-oriented policy during his presidency, his efforts were partially curtailed by 
opponents of his plan to end the SPHS program, which he abandoned as a result of the backlash. 
The current state of the education system is predominantly characterized by neoliberal features, 
such as a significant degree of school choice and the existence of SPHS. Path dependencies in 
policy can reduce the efficacy of a change in policy approach. They also make it difficult to 
determine to what degree the education system can be classified as neoliberal or equity-oriented. 
The new president Moon Jae-in has expressed intentions to return to an equity-oriented policy 
approach, which would be in accordance with the back-and-forth pattern exhibited by Korean 
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education policy historically. However, sociopolitical shifts related to higher socioeconomic 
disparity and the increased influence of the upper and middle classes on politics might affect 
Moon’s ability to create change. 
 Since the 1990s, the college admissions process has become progressively more similar 
to the U.S. process of admissions. Both administrations characterized as neoliberal and those 
characterized as equity-oriented enacted reforms that made the screening process more holistic. 
However, the rest of the education system is heavily exam-oriented. Competition to enter high-
ranking colleges is still fierce, and the wealthy still use their greater economic means to gain 
advantage. Furthermore, they do so using the same tools they used when admissions were 
primarily decided by the entrance exam: private tutoring and academies, as well as sending their 
students to elite high schools. Moon Jae-in’s plans to raise the significance of the entrance exam 
in admissions again indicates that the comprehensive screening process was not effective in 
deescalating competition or reducing socioeconomic disparities. 
 Efforts to restrict private tutoring through policy have also been characterized by back-
and-forth attempts to control tutoring either directly or indirectly. In the twenty-first century, the 
government has primarily tried to restrict private tutoring through improving the formal 
schooling system. This approach reflects neoliberal shifts in policy, as it forgoes direct 
government controls on the private sector. This neoliberal approach has, however, been mediated 
by semi-successful attempts to establish curfews. These curfews are one of the few reforms made 
to address the issue of student wellbeing and health. The other major example of policy focused 
on student wellbeing is the Free Semester Program, another reform enacted during the twenty-
first century. In fact, it appears that student wellbeing and health is a latecomer to policy goals, 
and has generally been ignored in policy discussions until more recently. The discourse around 
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educational quality in Korea has revolved primarily around producing students that score well on 
exams, and more recently on producing students with creative thinking skills. Student wellbeing 
has not been included as an important indicator of school quality, seeming more like an 
afterthought.  
 The back-and-forth nature of policy suggests that neither approach has accomplished the 
goals that the policymakers set out to achieve. The continued existence of the problems these 
policies have tried to address corroborates this theory. That being said, other explanations of 
policy shifts may need to be investigated in future research. For example, a general transition to 
neoliberal policies across government sectors in the 1990s also played a role in the neoliberal 
shift in education policy. Ultimately, it is necessary to look at the education policy from other 
perspectives to gain a better understanding of why both policy approaches have been somewhat 
unsuccessful. In the next chapter, I will review scholars’ analyses of and opinions about past and 
current Korean education policies, delving into the divide between those scholars who support 
the equalization policies and those who support the neoliberal policies.   
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IV. The Academic Literature on Korean Education Policy 
The alternation between equalization policies and neoliberal policies implemented by the 
Korean government has met an equally divided literature. Although there are scholars who argue 
for a balance of the two, they sometimes do not explain how their policy recommendations will 
work together to create this balance, or offer few concrete suggestions for how to create this 
needed balance at all.142 Both sides claim to be encouraging policies that are best for students, 
with student wellbeing and educational enrichment being common goals.  
However, scholars may at times appear to be talking past each other because their 
understandings of what is best for students is different. No scholar or politician will argue that 
national educational performance, school quality, families’ right to educational choice, 
socioeconomic disparities, students’ mental and physical health, or their enjoyment of learning is 
not an important aspect of an education system worth trying to improve through policy. 
Nevertheless, many have a primary focus that leads them to emphasize certain policies over 
others. For example, as the conductor of the PISA, the OECD tends to provide policy 
suggestions for improving student performance and school quality, with some recommendations 
for reducing socioeconomic inequality in the education system. 
While many scholars express their opinions on Korean government policy by criticizing 
or approving of past policy, some scholars express their opinions on Korean government policy 
primarily through offering suggestions on how to improve current policy by moving in a more 
neoliberal or equity-oriented direction. I suggest that scholars who suggest moving in a more 
neoliberal direction without providing any specific critiques of past neoliberal policies are 
generally supportive of these past policies, and vice versa for those who oppose a neoliberal 
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policy direction. 
In terms of shadow education, most scholars agree that a) education fever and parental 
pressures and b) the Korean government’s equalization policies of the 1960s and 1970s 
contributed to high demand for private education. However, the narrative about the causal 
relationship between the equalization policies and shadow education differ somewhat. The 
neoliberal scholars argue that these policies lowered the quality of formal schooling, requiring 
families to utilize private tutoring to provide their students with a good education. The equity-
oriented scholars argue that the policies did not lower the quality of schools in reality, but that 
affluent families thought they would. For these scholars, it was the inaccurate assumptions of 
these wealthy families that led them to turn to private tutoring. 
The existing literature about the Korean education system appears to hold an implicit 
consensus that the level of shadow education in Korea is problematic. In fact, this assertion 
seems to be so accepted that many scholars spend few to no words justifying it. If reasons are 
given, they are usually that private tutoring reinforces and increases socioeconomic disparities, 
and that it adds to the long hours students spend in class, depriving them of sleep and leisure 
time and being a detriment to their health. The only scholar who strays from this assertion is 
Seog Hun Jo, who asserts that shadow education is negatively coded primarily as a result of a 
“moral war” rhetoric that the government has used at times. This rhetoric places the “good” 
public education system in contradistinction with the “bad” private tutoring despite the fact that 
“cram schools and formal schools are identical in the provisions of teaching and learning for 
students”.143 
 
IV. A. Scholars who Support Neoliberal Policies 
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One group of scholars blames equalization policies for low-quality public education and a 
lack of diversity in schools, and favors neoliberal and deregulatory policy. The central idea 
behind this school of thought is that neoliberalization and deregulation will allow for freedom of 
choice on both the supply side and the demand side. School officials will have more autonomy in 
how schools are run, which will improve the quality of schools. Students will have the freedom 
to tailor their education to their individual needs, both in terms of school choice and curriculum. 
This will not only improve students’ individual education, but will encourage schools to improve 
through competition. For these scholars, students’ right to education is centered on freedom of 
choice.  
Gwang-jo Kim’s 2001 contribution to World Bank presentations for educational 
development in Africa, a summary and analysis of Korean education policy and reform, is 
perhaps the best example of the way supporters of neoliberal education policy frame their 
argument.144 He describes the shift from a more government-controlled education system to a 
more market-controlled system as a natural transition in accordance with the democratization of 
Korea in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The new education policy emphasized “quality, 
relevance, and excellence of education” and the new curriculum respected “individual 
difference.”145 Chong Jae Lee, Yong Kim, and Soo-yong Byun frame this shift in policy as a 
movement from “a focus on control to one on autonomy and accountability” and argue that 
students, parents, teachers, schools, and education boards should have more freedom of choice in 
the education system. 146 They specifically argue that private schools should have autonomy as 
well. 
But under current Korean education policy, despite neoliberal policy shifts particularly in 
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the 1990s and early 2000s, the formal education system is too centralized and regulated to be 
effective according to neoliberal values: efficiency and competitiveness. Many of these scholars 
acknowledge that equalization policies did serve an important purpose when they were 
established.147 Gwang-jo Kim points out that the equalization policies were very effective at 
expanding access to education in an equitable fashion. However, these scholars argue that the 
equalization policies, along with a national curriculum, had multiple problems. They prevented 
school autonomy and diversity, insulating schools “from competitive forces and local parents’ 
demands” and giving them little incentive to improve.148 Seeing schools as businesses, they 
blame policies like the HSEP for making it difficult for schools to adjust the curricula to “meet 
the needs of different stakeholders, including students, parents, and business firms,” which in 
turn encouraged the use of private tutoring.149 They also viewed the policies as violating 
students’ and schools’ rights, criticizing them for depriving students of “the right to choose the 
schools they wanted” and school administrators of “the opportunity to manage schools 
autonomously”150. 
According to these scholars, the high demand for private tutoring is a market response to 
society’s demands for educational resources that could not be satisfied by this ineffective and 
overregulated formal education system that resulted from equalization.151 Taejong Kim’s 
analysis of demand determinants for private tutoring indicates that demand for private tutoring is 
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significantly affected by poor school quality, more so than high stakes exams.152 He comes to 
this conclusion by analyzing National Assessment of Educational Achievement data from 2001 
in combination with standardized test scores as a measure of school productivity. He finds that 
private tutoring demand is significantly higher among students attending schools with lower 
productivity and lower scores, and blames this poor quality on “underprovided and overregulated 
formal schooling in Korea.”153 
Trying to find a more direct relationship between equalization policies and increased 
demand for private tutoring, Sunwoong Kim and Ju-Ho Lee analyzed data from the 1997 Survey 
on Private Tutoring (SOPT) conducted by the Korea Institute for Consumer Protection and the 
1998 Urban Household Expenditure Survey (UHES) by the National Statistical Office of 
Korea.154 They argue that their analysis indicates that students who lived in areas where the 
equalization policies were in effect spent more on private tutoring, contrary to the hopes of 
policy makers. Most of their results were not statistically significant, although they point out the 
policies certainly did not decrease expenditures on private tutoring. In light of these results, they 
recommend that tracking based on ability should be utilized in classes and that “the system 
should allow for more diverse types of schools, including high-cost private schools that provide a 
high quality of education with selective admission, in order to meet a diverse educational 
demand.” 155 
Some of these scholars argue that a balance between “excellence and equity” or 
“meritocracy and affirmative action” needs to be found in education policy.156 However, they 
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still support the neoliberal narrative that the equalization policies prevented schools from 
improving in quality because they forced homogeneity among schools and students. One of these 
scholars, Seog Hun Jo, does not think trying to reduce the usage of private education is still 
viable. He believes that attempts to control private tutoring through government policy have been 
unsuccessful because policy is not effective at altering parents’ perceptions about the need for 
private tutoring. He argues that “schools have to reluctantly surrender exclusive sovereignty over 
education and instead share it with private academies” because the line between public and 
private education has begun to blur.157 Because these kinds of statements tend to be made as 
concluding remarks, it is unclear how these scholars propose to achieve a balance of excellence 
and equity within a system where shadow education gains increasing presence. 
 
IV. B. Scholars who Oppose Neoliberal Policies 
Another group of scholars supports the government’s equalization policies, or at least 
does not blame these policies for creating an ineffective public education system.158 Rather, they 
reframe the issue as a problem of wealthier families' and conservative government officials’ 
subjective perception of degraded school quality under the equalization policies. In particular, 
Hyera Byean, Sang Young Park, and Doohwan Kim and Yool Choi are most adamant in 
expressing that the MOE’s equalization policies like the MSEP and the HSEP were opposed 
primarily by the affluent, as opposed to the general public.159 Byean writes that the policies were 
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“denounced for stifling students’ excellence and competitiveness, mostly by middle-class 
parents, conservative media, politicians, and university authorities…”160  
Kim and Choi and Park argue that the equalization policies of the 1960s and 1970s were 
the result of an authoritarian Korean development state trying to connect with the general 
public.161 To do so, the government had to keep the upper-middle classes in check. As a result, 
the elite classes had little influence over the creation of education policy. Instead, education 
policy was made with the common public’s desires in mind. Park refers to the transition to 
neoliberal government policy in the 1990s as a “dismantling of the egalitarian social contract”.162 
Neoliberal conservative politicians began to break the egalitarian social contract of the Korean 
developmental state as they moved towards neoliberal policy in all facets of society, including 
education. Local politicians furthered this trend to gain the votes of the middle class, which had 
grown in strength.163 Similarly to Byean, Park makes it clear that the movement away from 
equalization policies was due in part to neoliberal conservative politicians pursuing national 
economic competitiveness, and in part to the increasingly powerful affluent classes who, “aided 
by the ascending neoliberal ideology, [had] become far more effective in persuading policy 
makers in their favor, or bypassing the state’s policy goals”.164 He supports his assertions by 
pointing out surveys that indicated that around two-thirds of the population supported the HSEP 
as recently as the early 2000s, although parents with more education and higher incomes more 
often opposed the policy. 
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 These scholars also criticize neoliberal education reform for creating or heightening 
inequality in the Korean education system, and encouraging the increased usage of shadow 
education. For example, Kim and Choi blame neoliberal deregulation policy for excessive 
spending on private education by upper-middle class families trying to send their children to elite 
schools. These policies moved education to the market-based sphere of society, where those with 
more social and economic capital have the advantage and “competitive individualism 
[dismantles] the egalitarian social contract”.165 In another study, Soo-yong Byun and Kyung-
keun Kim analyze the TIMSS scores of Korean eighth-grade students from the 1999, 2003, and 
2007 exams. They find that students’ socioeconomic background has had an increasing influence 
over performance on the exam over the first ten years of the 21st century. Byun and Kim point to 
neoliberal educational policies that allow for more school choice and reinstate tracking as causal 
factors for this growing educational inequality. They call for further policy to mitigate this 
problem. They, like other scholars in this school, believe that under the illusion of providing all 
students with educational choice, the MOE has actually provided only those who can afford it 
with the freedom to choose. Students who cannot afford a higher quality education from the very 
beginning lose their opportunities to receive a better education and better jobs later on. For these 
scholars, students’ right to education is centered on a right to an equal education regardless of 
socioeconomic status. 
Byun and Kim also cite studies that suggest that randomized school assignment policies 
“would not lead to a decline in student achievement”, in contrast to the beliefs of the upper-
middle classes in Korea.166 Although these studies are not available in English, Jaesung Choi and 
                                                
165 Kim and Choi, “The Irony of the Unchecked Growth of Higher Education in South Korea: Crystallization of 
Class Cleavages and Intensifying Status Competition,” 449. 
166 Byun and Kim, “Educational Inequality in South Korea: The Widening Socioeconomic Gap in Student 
Achievement,” 166. 
  
56 
Jisoo Hwang’s 2017 study supports a similar idea: that allowing for more school choice may 
create disadvantages for lower SES students because of the change in educational 
environment.167 Choi and Hwang analyzed 2010-2012 data from the National Assessment of 
Educational Achievement (NAEA) administered to second year high school students, which 
included students affected by a new Seoul policy of increased school choice. Their analysis 
found a small increase in high-performing students’ relative achievement, but “the drop in low-
ability students' relative test scores [was] more prominent and [was] observed across a wider 
range of the test score distribution, particularly in math.”168 
Like Byun and Kim, other scholars also oppose neoliberal tracking policies. Byean 
argues that tracking widens the achievement gap, encourages segregation, and in general 
exacerbates inequalities. She cites research that demonstrates that tracking in Korea is 
ineffective: it “has not contributed to reducing the high cost of private education, let alone 
narrowed the achievement gap among students” as proponents argued it would.169 Both Byean 
and Kim and Choi view tracking policies as a method for the privileged classes to maintain and 
reinforce their status by segregating their children from others, while conveniently disguising 
class-based inequalities under the guise of separation by performance levels.170  
 
IV. C. A Third Group? 
There appear to be somewhat fewer scholars who oppose neoliberal education policy. 
However, the picture may appear somewhat more balanced if one argues that some scholars 
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reside in a middle ground. Some scholars, like Chong Jae Lee, Heesook Lee, and Hyo Min Jang 
take a neutral stance on past educational policy, refraining from expressing clear support for one 
type of policy or the other.171 They do, however, point out that equalization policies were 
essentially ineffective for reducing demand for private tutoring because tutoring rates continued 
to rise during that time period. In the same way, the ban on tutoring may have prevented a certain 
amount of private tutoring, but it also led to illegal instances of shadow education as people 
continued tutoring practices. As for the more neoliberal policies that focus on school and student 
autonomy in the hopes of lessening shadow education, Lee, Lee, and Jang say the impact of 
these policies is still unclear. Like Jo, they also argue that government policy is unable to 
“reduce the demand mechanism for shadow education”.172 Thus they suggest that policy should 
be focused primarily on improving the public school system rather than controlling the shadow 
education industry directly. 
Some scholars argue that schools need more autonomy to improve formal school quality, 
which falls in line with the rhetoric of Korea’s past neoliberal policies. However, they also argue 
these policies need to include controls to prevent socioeconomic disparity as a result.173 Scholars 
such as these may justify creating a new school of scholarship in the literature, to group those 
who encourage a balanced education policy. However, some of these scholars suggest some kind 
of balance is necessary in response to growing socioeconomic disparities in the education 
system, but fail to provide any concrete suggestions for how to create this balance.174 Thus, it is 
questionable whether some of these scholars are serious about finding this balance or are simply 
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trying to signal awareness of these growing disparities while still ultimately supporting 
neoliberal policy. 
 
IV. D. Institutional and Disciplinary Divisions among Scholars 
It is worth noting that scholars like Randall Jones, Masahiko Tsutsumi, and Gwang-jo 
Kim, who write for or in association with traditionally Western liberal capitalist organizations 
such as the OECD and the World Bank nearly always support neoliberal education policy and 
find fault with equalization policies, associating them with low quality education.175 These 
organizations have an impact in determining national education policies; in particular, the OECD 
as the founder of the PISA plays a large role simply by determining the measured indicators and 
priorities of the PISA. Education policy and policy recommendations based on PISA results 
focus foremost on improving student performance, with socioeconomic factors being somewhat 
important, and student mental health issues rather marginalized in the discourse.176  
Furthermore, several scholars among those who support neoliberal policies have worked 
for the Korean government. Gwang-jo Kim became Director-General of the Ministry of 
Education and Human Resources Development in 2004, and was Deputy Minister of Education 
and Human Resources Development from 2005 to 2008. Ju-Ho Lee was a member of the 
National Assembly from 2004 to 2008, was the Senior Secretary to the President for Education, 
Science, and Culture until 2009, and served as the Minister of Education, Science, and 
Technology from 2010 to 2013. In addition, he is a professor at the Korean Development 
Institute (KDI) School of Public Policy and Management. The KDI is a government-run 
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economic think tank. Taejong Kim is also a professor and the managing director of the 
Development Research and Learning Network at the KDI School. In contrast, none of the 
scholars supporting equity-based policies were affiliated with the Korean government in a 
similar fashion, except perhaps for Doohwan Kim and Yool Choi, whose research was funded by 
the government through the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant. Furthermore, the 
relationship between scholars’ government affiliation and their support for neoliberal policies is 
unclear because their terms in office do not necessarily align with executive administrations that 
supported neoliberal education policies. 
Most of the scholars publishing on the topic of Korean education policy are from the 
fields of economics, education, and policy. However, there are a few scholars from the fields of 
sociology and social and political studies contributing to the literature: Sang Young Park, 
Doohwan Kim, and Yool Choi. Furthermore, Sang Young Park and Hyera Byean take a critical 
perspective to their respective fields: social and political change, and English education and 
pedagogies. All of the scholars in these disciplines support equity-oriented policies. In contrast, 
none of the scholars supporting neoliberal policies came from these fields. This suggests that 
social sciences and critical studies scholars tend to agree with an equity-oriented approach to 
education as a result of their academic background. 
 
IV. E. Discussion 
 The neoliberal scholars emphasize the importance of allowing for autonomy and student 
choice, and they argue that equalization policies lead to poor school quality and lack of diversity. 
They blame equalization policies and the restriction of tracking for downward leveling of 
students. However, most neoliberal scholars do not address how students without sufficient 
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financial means are supposed to gain access to high quality schooling in a neoliberal system. In 
an education system that allows access to high quality education to be controlled by the market, 
prices will inevitably rise and place financial strains on low-income families trying to participate. 
Although high quality education may exist in a neoliberal system, only a select group of people 
has access to it. It is thus doubtful whether such a system can be classified as high quality, 
because not all of its students actually receive that quality education. Students who lack the 
economic resources in fact have little to no choice in where they receive their education. There 
are some neoliberal scholars who propose affirmative action policies to mitigate the issues of the 
neoliberal education system. However, they do not acknowledge that a system that necessitates 
affirmative action policies may not be ideal. 
In contrast to the arguments of the neoliberal scholars, it is possible to have an equity-
oriented system that still produces high quality schools and allows for autonomy and diversity. 
However, equity-oriented scholars in the field of Korean education policy do not address how 
this can be achieved. In other words, equity-oriented scholars have not sufficiently discussed the 
issue of equitable or horizontal diversity and its incorporation into policy.  
 In regards to shadow education, both schools of scholars blame the opposing policy 
approach and its proponents for instigating growth in private tutoring. It is difficult to conclude 
whether either school is correct because the shadow education industry has grown continually 
over time regardless of policy approach, except perhaps during the 1980 ban of private tutoring. 
Based on the data, it is simply apparent that neither form of policy has been able to significantly 
reduce the use of shadow education. However, in a rare moment of consensus, neither school 
argues for extensive direct controls on shadow education. Neoliberal scholars tend to explicitly 
argue for allowing the market to regulate the shadow education industry. Equity-oriented 
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scholars do not explicitly argue this, but they also do not argue for direct government controls on 
private tutoring. Rather, both schools of thought argue that improving formal schooling will 
reduce the prevalence of private tutoring. 
 This is where the consensus between schools ends, because their concepts of what 
improvement of the formal schooling system looks like are very different. Like the Korean 
government over time, scholars cannot reach an agreement about which type of policy is most 
effective. It appears that the same divisions present in the government also limit the scholars to 
two schools because the scholars are trying to engage directly with the reality of government 
policy. Furthermore, like policymakers, scholars have not paid significant attention to policies 
that focus on student wellbeing. There has been almost no attempt to analyze the effectiveness of 
wellbeing-oriented policies like the Free Semester Program.  
Instead of exploring new pathways for policy direction, most of the scholars continue to 
work within the existing pathways the Korean government has followed. Because most scholars 
are trying to analyze and evaluate past and current policy, it is perhaps unsurprising that scholars 
find themselves split along the same lines by which government policy has been divided. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult for scholars to bring new material to the discussion as a result, and 
topics such as student wellbeing to which the government does not attend are also left 
unaddressed by scholars. In order to depart from these traditional divisions in Korean policy and 
the literature discussing it, the next chapter will review some policies from other countries.   
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V. Education Policies Addressing Quality and Equity in Other Countries 
The previous chapters have indicated that neither the Korean government nor the 
academic literature on Korean education have been able to reach a consensus on an education 
policy scheme that effectively achieves both quality and equity. Student wellbeing as a factor of 
educational quality has only recently become more acknowledged as an important policy goal, 
and as a result policy that attempts to address it has only been implemented more recently. 
Scholars responding to policy have thus often not addressed student wellbeing either. In this 
chapter, I will examine other countries that have attempted to address the balance of educational 
quality and equity through policy, in the hopes that this may generate some useful insights for 
Korean education policy. 
I will discuss China and Japan’s policies because they share similar cultural backgrounds 
and exam-based educational systems with Korea. Their international test scores are also 
relatively analogous. In the 2015 PISA results, Japan ranked 2nd in science, 5th in math, and 8th in 
reading, in comparison to Korea’s scores of 11th in science, 7th in math, and 7th in reading. China 
ranked 10th in science, 6th in math, and 27th in reading. The 2015 PISA scores for China only 
included the scores of students from Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Guangdong.177 In the 2012 
PISA results, Shanghai, which I will discuss as an individual case of policy reform later in the 
chapter, scored first in all three subjects as an individual entity.178 Despite China and Korea’s 
similarities, the comparison of the two countries is somewhat limited by their different levels of 
development. In contrast to Korea and Japan’s 2017 Human Development Index (HDI) rankings 
of 22nd at 0.903 and 19th at 0.909 respectively, China’s ranking was 86th with a value of 0.752. 
Korea and Japan’s 2017 Gini coefficient values were 31.6 and 32.1 respectively (with 0.0 being 
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perfect equality and 100.0 being perfect inequality), in contrast to China’s value of 42.2.179 
Furthermore, China is geographically much larger than Korea and disparities between rural and 
urban populations are larger. Finland, although culturally very different from Korea, is closer in 
terms of size, wealth, and income distribution. Finland’s 2017 HDI ranking was 15th with a value 
of 0.920, and its Gini coefficient value for the same year was 27.1.180 It is also useful to look at 
Finland because it has been widely revered for an education system that is simultaneously 
equitable and produces high-achieving students. On the 2015 PISA, Finnish students ranked 5th 
in science, 13th in math, and 4th in reading.181 
One can learn valuable lessons from observing other countries’ policy successes and 
failures. Though the causal factors and intervening variables are different, many countries face 
similar problems with balancing educational quality and equity and have responded to these 
problems in various ways. Therefore this chapter will present some other countries’ policy 
responses to educational inequity and shadow education to investigate whether particular types 
of policy have been more effective at addressing these issues. Modeling one country’s education 
policy after another country is recognizably problematic. Each country’s policy is shaped and 
limited by its particular educational, economic, political, cultural, geographic, and social 
conditions. When comparing policy, one must keep in mind that a successful policy in one 
country may not be appropriate or feasible in another. There are some concerns in the 
comparative education field that as countries copy the policy reforms of model countries, the 
world will move toward a singular international model of education that disregards cultural 
context and serves poorly the needs of some countries. However, scholars like Gita Steiner-
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Khamsi argue that this is not the case.182 Globalization has certainly allowed for countries to 
learn from others’ experiences, but policymakers do not simply copy other countries’ reforms. 
Although policymakers may refer to an international model of education to justify domestically 
derived reforms to the public, in reality there is no such international consensus on a universally 
correct education model. Borrowed policies go through “processes of local adaptation, 
modification, and resistance to global forces in education” as policymakers adjust them to suit 
their country’s conditions and needs.183 It cannot be assumed that borrowing policy will result in 
identical or even mostly similar reforms. 
Unfortunately, the scope of this paper does not permit an in-depth review of many 
different countries’ policies or a full description of various countries’ education systems. 
Consequently, I have selected a few experiences, giving preference to broad policies that make 
large-scale changes because these generally have more noticeable effects. I have chosen to 
preference policies that prioritize student wellbeing in their goals. These policies, like Korea’s, 
have had varying levels of success. I will also discuss policies that regulate shadow education 
implemented in several East Asian countries. However, most governments’ lack of restrictive 
regulation on shadow education limits the provision of examples of governments successfully 
minimizing this industry. Rather, most governments regulate shadow education as they might 
any other product or service, and do not attempt to limit its prevalence. 
A survey of the literature suggests that the general trend in many countries around the 
world has been towards neoliberal, decentralizing, and marketizing education policies.184 In 
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particular, much of the more recent research on the Nordic education systems has documented a 
neoliberal trend in Nordic policy. While these policies may arguably improve the quality of some 
schools, scholars are concerned that they will detract from the equitable distribution of this 
quality education. Some of the equity-based policies discussed in the following pages may no 
longer be in use, or may be functioning at reduced capacity due to these newer policies. They are 
not necessarily representative of the wider education policy landscape in that country at the 
current moment. 
 
V. A. Policy for Quality and Equity, with a Focus on Student Wellbeing 
Japan 
Like Korea, the Japanese education system is very competitive and exam-driven. In order 
to prepare for upper secondary and university entrance exams, the curriculum has often 
contained large amounts of material and stressed rote memorization. Beginning in the late 1970s, 
many people became increasingly dissatisfied with the Japanese education system, arguing that it 
placed too much pressure on students, did not encourage enjoyment of learning, and did not 
teach creative thinking or independent learning skills.185 
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From the late 1970s up until the early twenty-first century, Japanese education policy 
underwent the yutori reform, or the “relaxed education” or “low-pressure education” reform to 
improve student wellbeing by decreasing the academic burden on students. Many sources 
provide details about what this reform entailed.186 Several times over the recent decades, the 
primary and secondary school curricula were increasingly relaxed to allow students more free 
time and more flexibility in the subjects they learned. Class hours were shortened multiple times 
and the number of holidays was increased, until finally in 2002 public schools shifted from the 
six-day to the five-day school week. The teaching of certain concepts was pushed until later in 
the schooling process, and in that same year, the Japanese government had reduced its 
curriculum by thirty percent.187  
Beginning in third grade, 15 to 20% of the hours previously spent on basic academic 
subjects like science and social studies were required to be spent instead on “integrated study”. 
Integrated study was supposed to encourage cross-disciplinary and student-initiated learning, and 
the development of thinking skills. Themes of integrated study included international exchange 
and information technology, to help prepare students for a globalized world.188 Schools often 
conducted “activities such as hands-on experience, going out into the community and 
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interviewing, self-evaluation, and small group presentations that were aimed at developing 
communication skills.”189 Grading practices were also relaxed; assessments that previously 
tested relative performance were to evaluate absolute achievement.190 The yutori reform was 
supposed to improve student wellbeing by allowing for a more individualized and enjoyable 
learning experience that encouraged a “zest for living”.191 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess the success of the yutori reform on improving 
student wellbeing because the backlash against the 2002 reform resulted in the Japanese 
government beginning to reverse some of its features. Opponents of the reform feared that it 
would lower the academic achievement of Japanese students, “undermine Japan’s international 
competitiveness and turn it into ‘a nation at risk’”.192 The PISA results that the OECD released in 
2001 and 2004, along with TIMSS results, further heightened this controversy, as they revealed 
that Japanese students’ performance had worsened slightly. Opponents of the yutori reform 
blamed it for the lower scores. The literature is still divided as to whether the yutori reform was 
actually to blame for lower scores.193 Keita Takayama points out that most of the score 
differences in the PISA were statistically insignificant.194 
Some of the literature does argue that the yutori reform, despite its attempt to improve 
school quality and student wellbeing, worsened socioeconomic disparities in education and 
“eroded the egalitarian foundation of Japanese education”.195 The government did not provide 
schools and teachers with the financial and educational resources to properly implement the 
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yutori reform.196 Furthermore, the reform did not change the competitive nature or difficulty 
levels of entrance exams. Thus parents who could afford it felt the need to turn to private schools 
or private academies, where the yutori reform was less stringent or did not apply, for their 
children’s education. Thus the reform was blamed for making public schools less competitive. 
Students from lower-income families who did not receive support to perform well at home or 
students in rural areas without access to private schools and tutoring centers suffered the most 
from the reform.197 Some scholars have demonstrated that the yutori reform increased private 
tutoring center attendance, raised education expenditures, and increased the gap between lower 
and higher SES groups in the classroom.198 In addition, the socioeconomic disparities supposedly 
created by the yutori reform were exacerbated by other reforms implemented simultaneously by 
neoliberal politicians. Along with the shortened class hours and minimized curriculum of the 
yutori reform, these other reforms allowed for more school choice and tracking practices.199 
In 2007, the Japanese government decided to abolish the yutori policy.200 The 
government continues to move toward more neoliberal policies, and has increased school hours 
and curriculum content. 
China 
China does not appear to have put in place many large-scale policies that improve 
educational equity, instead implementing reforms for quality education that disproportionately 
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benefit the wealthy, urban students, and high-performing students.201 Although China’s central 
government still has the power to implement national education reforms, it has increasingly 
decentralized the process of policymaking and implementation since the end of the Cultural 
Revolution, allowing policy reform at the local level.202 Thus, while affirmative action programs 
have been at times put in place to give preferential treatment in university admissions for low-
income or rural students, they have generally been at a smaller, local scale. For example, this 
kind of reform was implemented in 1992 in Shanghai, but only by six higher education 
institutions, and it applied only to students from twenty-two peripheral rural regions.203 In an 
attempt to decrease the exam-oriented nature of the education system that encourages rote 
memorization over critical thinking, China has enacted various reforms that modify the 
curriculum and grant universities more autonomy over the student selection process.  
Much of the literature focuses on the above kind of reforms as they took place in 
Shanghai.204 This is because Shanghai is considered the leader and a “pioneer” in Chinese 
education reform.205 Shanghai has often been an innovator of policy and has frequently been one 
of the first cities in China to implement national education reforms. Its education system is 
regarded as high quality. Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, Shanghai reformed its curriculum to 
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emphasize creativity and practical application.206 In addition to the “foundational subjects” that 
are compulsory for all students and include math, language, and the natural and social sciences, 
the Shanghai curriculum also includes expanded subjects and inquiry/research subjects. 
Expanded subjects include real-life applications of foundational subjects as well as non-
compulsory subjects like sports and arts. The inquiry/research subjects, similar to the Japanese 
yutori reform’s integrated study, are intended to encourage student-initiated learning, real-life 
application, and independent thinking. They may involve independent research on a theme of the 
student’s interest, whether that interest is multi-disciplinary or falls under the foundational 
subjects.207 Related to this curriculum reform, the Shanghai government has required randomized 
primary and lower secondary school admissions since 1997, prohibited ability-tracking in 
classes, and reduced homework and class hours.208 In addition, Shanghai was one of the first 
cities of China to grant universities more autonomy in admissions, allowing them to consider 
students’ other exam scores, grades, awards and achievements, and other indicators of secondary 
school performance along with the entrance exam score.209 
While these reforms may shift university admissions from a more exam-oriented system 
to a more ability-oriented system, they do little to address the socioeconomic and regional 
disparities in students’ academic performance at the primary and secondary levels. Moreover, 
because the university entrance exam remains extremely important for most students despite 
reforms, schools and teachers who feel pressured by parents to prepare students for the exam 
often ignore curriculum reform that deemphasizes teaching to the test. Like the cases of Korea 
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and Japan, Chinese parents who feel that formal schooling is not preparing their children for the 
exam will send their children to private cram schools.210 Key schools (schools considered elite 
based on their quality and resources) in Shanghai usually enjoy a great deal of leeway in ignoring 
reforms and focusing on exam-oriented content and maintain longer class hours, enhancing their 
competitiveness over normal schools.211 Opponents also worry that reforms will exacerbate 
corruption in the admissions process, as universities with increased autonomy over the 
admissions process can let in more students with personal connections or financial resources.212 
In addition to these quality-oriented reforms in Shanghai, the national Chinese 
government’s 2000 jianfu or “burden reduction” policy should be noted for its similarity to 
Japan’s yutori reform. This policy was also supposed to improve student creativity and reduce 
the pressures surrounding entrance exams. The reform required “reducing or eliminating 
homework, reducing the number of books students had to purchase, and abolishing school-based 
extracurricular study and cramming sessions.”213 The policy was connected to some policies that 
limited tracking and increased randomized placement in secondary schools. It also encouraged 
students to use their increased free time and vacations to engage in creative and active-learning 
activities, although polls in Beijing found that “without any homework to do, the majority of 
children polled spent their vacations at home alone, watching television.”214 In 2018, parents 
were outspoken against the jianfu policy, arguing that it disadvantages lower-income students. 
Universities still prioritize test scores in the admissions process, so the jianfu policy pushes 
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parents toward expensive private education options.215 It should also be noted that the jianfu 
policy was framed not in terms of improving student wellbeing, but in terms of producing 
innovative citizens that would increase China’s competitiveness in the global economy.216 
Finland 
The Nordic model of education is well known in the world of comparative education for 
its success at balancing equitable and quality education through a comprehensive school 
system.217 In particular, Finland is marked as the epitome or most successful execution of the 
Nordic model. Not only does it sit at the top of PISA assessments, but also there is minimal 
difference in the scores of the highest-performing and lowest-performing students. Schools are 
funded almost entirely through public funds, and the Finnish government does not spend 
significantly more on education than other countries; expenditures are at the OECD average of 
approximately 6% of GDP. Students do not spend long hours studying: on average, Finnish 
students study mathematics for 4.4 hours per week, in comparison with the Korean average of 
over 10 hours. The shadow education industry is minimal to nonexistent.218 Furthermore, Finnish 
students have reported less anxiety about studying than other countries: for example, in the 2004 
PISA report, 7% of Finnish students (compared to 52% Japanese students) reported experiencing 
anxiety when working on mathematics tasks at home.219 As a result of Finland’s success, a 
number of studies and articles have been written on the topic of Finland’s education system and 
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why it is so successful.220 
Firstly, Finland does not have a culture of competitive exam-oriented schooling. There 
are no external high-stakes exams during or at the end of primary and secondary school in 
Finland. Its assessment of student learning is instead based on teacher-made tests or other forms 
of evaluation decided on and conducted by teachers, such as portfolio evaluations. Starting in 
fifth grade, giving numerical grades is legally prohibited, “only descriptive assessments and 
feedback are employed.”221 The lack of pressure to prepare students for exams in Finnish schools 
allows teachers more freedom and exploration in curriculum and teaching techniques. There is an 
entrance examination for tertiary education where competition is fierce. However, this exam 
does not appear to create a significant amount of washback; in other words, the secondary school 
curriculum is not significantly changed by attempts to prepare students for the exam. In addition, 
Finland encourages self-assessment of school and teacher performance and discourages inter-
school competition; for example, it does not publicly rank schools based on student achievement 
data. “National, sample-based evaluations of student achievement and of students’ health and 
welfare, and by thematic evaluations” of, for example, special needs education, influences the 
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self-assessment of educational administration at the national and municipal levels.222 
In addition to these accountability techniques, there appear to be two principles of the 
Finnish education system that work together: equitable, diverse schools and classrooms equipped 
with educators who have been well-educated and well-trained to teach heterogeneous 
classrooms. Finnish preschool and basic education is free and students receive “free instructional 
materials, warm school meals, health and dental care and, if necessary, transport and 
accommodation at the primary and lower secondary level.”223 Until the 1970s, Finland had a 
selective school system that split students into an academic and a vocational track at age 11. In a 
gradual transition throughout the 1970s, Finland implemented a comprehensive school system in 
which students received the same education for the first nine years; academic and vocational 
tracking was delayed until age 16. Admissions to these tracks were based on comprehensive 
grades, not an exam.224 A study by Pekkarinen, Uusitalo, and Kerr found that this policy reform 
reduced intergenerational income elasticity by 23%, effectively improving intergenerational 
economic mobility.225 It should be noted that Korea also uses a comprehensive school system. 
However, Korea has increasingly used ability tracking in classrooms whereas Finland does not, 
as Finnish policies are meant to encourage classroom diversity. 
Furthermore, the Finnish government has granted teachers the pedagogical flexibility 
necessary to handle classrooms with students of diverse abilities and interests since its 
decentralizing curriculum reform in the 1980s and 1990s. Parents also trust teachers “as 
professionals who know what is best for their children.”226 Until 1985, the education system and 
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curriculum were very centralized. The new policy reform developed what is often referred to as a 
“culture of trust”.227 The national curriculum provides a more general guideline that schools and 
teachers can tailor to their classrooms. The option to add additional subjects to the compulsory 
ones is available. In addition to strong teacher education, each basic school (primary and lower 
secondary) has a “student welfare team” to ensure the wellbeing of all students, including those 
that may require special education.228 The student welfare team is required to meet at least twice 
monthly for two hours and includes “the principal, the special education teacher, the school 
nurse, the school psychologist, a social worker, and the teachers whose students are being 
discussed.”229 
There is one other policy that was temporarily enacted in a Nordic state that deserves 
mention. In the 1960s, Sweden completely eliminated its secondary school and university 
entrance exam system after widespread criticism that the system facilitated socioeconomic 
inequalities and competition, impaired teaching, and harmed student wellbeing.230 The university 
admissions process became entirely reliant on high school grades and regular, internal school 
exam scores. While this improved equality in the admissions process, it necessitated a 
convoluted system of “equivalences, inspection, and control of internal high school grading, 
accompanied by teacher training and exchange of information on grading standards.”231 Despite 
these efforts made by the Swedish government, the system was ultimately not clear or effective. 
As a result, Sweden has returned to an admissions process that includes a standardized test 
similar to the U.S.’s SAT. 
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V. B. Controls on Private Tutoring (or Lack Thereof) in East Asia 
The literature on government regulation of shadow education is scant, primarily because 
“Korea has been the most prominent exception to a worldwide pattern of a laissez-faire approach 
to supplementary education.”232 There appear to be very few government limitations on shadow 
education anywhere the industry exists.233 Instead, governments tend to regulate private tutoring 
as a commodity; in other words, regulations are focused primarily on safety regulations, quality 
assurance, financial and administrative issues, and the minimization of corruption. Otherwise, 
the shadow education industry is allowed to develop according to market forces. Policy makers 
in East Asia, where the prevalence of private tutoring is most well known, often regard shadow 
education as a useful or even necessary part of the education system that covers for the 
shortcomings of formal education.234 A senior policymaker from the Thai government’s Office 
of Private Education Commission (OPEC) even said, “The state does not have the policy to 
control. Rather OPEC is responsible for supporting private education according to the Private 
School Act.”235 The official position in Thailand is that private tutoring “does not reduce the 
social welfare” and that “the state should maximize the benefits of private tutoring in order to 
create a successful knowledge economy”.236 
In 1978, the Taiwanese Department of Education banned tutoring classes from taking in 
primary school students, and from providing tutoring to lower secondary school students during 
school hours. From 1961 to 1991, the Thai Ministry of Education limited the expansion of 
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private tutoring centers in Bangkok and Metropolitan areas, but did not require the shutdown of 
existing centers nor prevent the opening of new centers in other regions.237 Korea appears to be 
the only example of a government banning private tutoring in its entirety at any point in time. 
The governments of Mainland China, Taiwan, Macao, Thailand, and Japan have 
sanctioned private tutoring by regulating it as a regular industry without serious attempts to limit 
its occurrence, and in some cases blurring the lines between public and private education.238 
Although these are also issues in Korea, the official discourse on shadow education is more 
negative than other places; policy goals still include minimizing its existence. 
There are a few common features of private tutoring regulations in the systems 
mentioned above. Sometimes a special office within the government is created to regulate and 
monitor the private tutoring industry and tutoring centers, such as the Office of Private Education 
Commission in Thailand or the supplementary private tutoring section under the life-long 
learning division in the Taipei Education Bureau in Taiwan.239 Tutoring centers usually need to 
be licensed or registered with the government, although sometimes small providers are not 
required to be licensed, as is the case in Macao.240 The buildings where tutoring centers are held 
must meet hygiene and safety codes and are subject to inspections. There is often some form of 
regulation about the minimum education level of tutors, although the level varies based on 
country. Regulation assuring the quality of the actual content taught in private tutoring centers 
                                                
237 Lao, 481. 
238 The sovereignty of Taiwan is contentious, and Macao is a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China. 
However, for the purposes of this paper, they will be considered individual and separate entities because they have 
independent education systems.  
239 Shengli Zhan, “The Private Tutoring Industry in Taiwan: Government Policies and Their Implementation,” Asia 
Pacific Journal of Education 34, no. 4 (2014): 499, https://doi.org/10.1080/02188791.2014.960796; Lao, 
“Analyzing the Thai State Policy on Private Tutoring: The Prevalence of the Market Discourse.” 
240 Titus Siu Pang Li and Ben Cheong Choi, “Private Supplementary Tutoring in Macao: Past, Present and the 
Future,” Asia Pacific Journal of Education 34, no. 4 (2014): 512, https://doi.org/10.1080/02188791.2014.978743. 
  
78 
tends to be less developed.241 However, in the case of Thailand, the government so highly 
regulates private tutoring centers that it has identified a 45 student to 1 tutor class ratio and 
designed a curriculum tutoring centers are required to follow.242 
In order to prevent corruption, governments like those of China and Taiwan prohibit 
schoolteachers from providing private tutoring; however, research in Mainland China indicates 
this law has not always been well enforced, with schoolteachers still tutoring during school 
vacations. The government of Macao does not strictly regulate schoolteachers providing private 
tutoring.243 Governments may also provide guidance to students and their families about 
selecting reputable and law-abiding private tutoring centers, as Macao and Taiwan have done 
through the form of websites. The Taipei Education Bureau has also set up a hotline for 
consumer complaints about private tutoring issues.244 
Japan’s formal education system and its tutoring institution industry have had an 
unusually intertwined relationship, blurring the boundary between public and private education 
sectors. When tutoring centers initially became popular in the 1960s, the government strongly 
criticized the centers but did not try to control the industry. During the 1980s and 1990s, the 
government began to regulate the industry and eventually recognized the centers as a valid form 
of education. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the relationship between the 
government, formal schools, and tutoring centers has grown increasingly close. National and 
local government and schools have entered into partnerships with tutoring centers to provide 
tutoring on school grounds after school hours to “improve public provision of formal schooling” 
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and make individual schools more competitive.245 As the relationship between formal schooling 
and tutoring centers became more cooperative, the Ministry of Education recognized tutoring 
centers as “an alternative educational platform for extra-curricular activities”.246  During the 
yutori reform discussed in the previous section, the Japanese government asked tutoring centers 
to provide free activities for children during weekends and holidays to provide educational 
opportunities they could not get in the classroom.247 More recently, curriculum reforms have 
even encouraged partnerships to provide low-cost classes in schools provided by tutoring 
centers, and special tutoring centers run by “public-private partnerships initiated and monitored 
by local governments” that provide free tutoring for children of low-income families or who 
were victims of natural disasters.248 While this public-private blending may reduce the negative 
effect the private tutoring industry has on economic disparities, it is questionable how sustainable 
“working with the public sector for hardly any monetary gain” will be for the private tutoring 
industry.249 
Like Korea, some governments have implemented free alternatives to private tutoring to 
try to lessen the financial burden on families. For example, the Education and Youth Affairs 
Bureau of Macao created a program called the “Phoning service of homework guidance”, which 
trained volunteers to give homework help to primary and secondary school students.250 In 
Thailand, there has been a proposal to offer “educational vouchers” to make private tutoring 
more affordable for lower-income students, but it is not clear whether this has been put into 
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practice.251 In Shanghai, the local government encourages schools to arrange free tutoring for 
struggling students outside of class hours, but this encouragement is generally ignored.252 
 
V. C. Discussion 
 Among the examples discussed, Finland has been the most successful in creating an 
equitable and high quality education system that maintains a high level of student wellbeing. Its 
low-pressure and non-exam-oriented model, along with its culture of trust in teachers, produces 
little exam washback even though it has a competitive college entrance exam. The Finnish 
school system has also achieved horizontal diversity within an equitable system by allowing 
teachers control over their curricula. Giving teachers this level of control might not be possible if 
parents and policymakers did not trust teachers to know what is best for students. 
 In contrast, countries with competitive exam-oriented systems like Japan and China face 
complaints from low-income families when they enact “relaxed education” reforms that are 
intended to reduce academic pressure. Countries like these that have high educational 
competition and large private tutoring industries struggle to enact reforms on the formal school 
system because demand can shift to the private sector and private tutors if it is not satisfied in the 
public sector. In other words, relaxed education reforms usually encourage high-income families 
to spend more on shadow education, which in turn frustrates families of lesser means who cannot 
afford the same levels of private tutoring to give their children the same advantage. This 
evidence suggests that relaxed education reforms are not effective in countries like Japan, China, 
and Korea because they are not targeting the root of the problem: educational competition. 
Because the educational competition that drives families to spend so much money on private 
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tutoring is still intense despite the reforms, families’ finances and students’ wellbeing continue to 
suffer under heavy academic pressures. Private tutoring picks up the slack where formal 
schooling relaxed. Furthermore, China and Japan, similarly to Korea, seem to have largely 
ignored the importance of student wellbeing in educational quality. Japan’s yutori reform was a 
significant attempt to make student wellbeing and relieving academic pressure a central goal of 
policy, but it was met with such extensive backlash that it was short-lived. 
 This discussion of other countries’ reforms has also indicated that complete removal of 
entrance exams is not a viable policy option. Although entrance exams have their own host of 
problems, abolishing them creates an admissions process rife with inconsistencies and 
inefficiencies. It is difficult to ensure fairness in an admissions process entirely reliant on high 
school records because each school is different. Furthermore, Finland serves as evidence that an 
education system can be both equitable and high quality while still utilizing a competitive 
college entrance exam. This suggests that removing a high-stakes entrance exam is not necessary 
to achieve an equitable and high quality education system. Rather, building an education model 
with a culture of trust that does not overemphasize exams throughout the schooling process 
appears to be more effective.  
 Finally, this chapter found that Korea was the leading example in attempts to restrict 
shadow education. In other East Asian countries, governments’ perceptions of shadow education 
are more positive than inside Korea. Shadow education is seen as something that can compensate 
for the shortcomings of the formal school system. Thus, it is regulated as a product and 
governments do not try to reduce the use of private tutoring through policy. Japan has even gone 
as far as allowing significant blurring between the public and private sectors through 
collaborations between schools and tutoring centers. It appears that East Asian governments have 
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essentially decided that there is no point in trying to restrict private tutoring. In the twenty-first 
century, Korea also seems to subscribe to this approach, suggesting that restricting shadow 
education through policy may be infeasible.  
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VI. Conclusion 
VI. A. Summary 
This paper has attempted to provide some insight into the Korean government’s policy 
attempts to achieve a balance between educational excellence and equity. At the beginning of 
this paper, I identified some of the prominent issues in Korea’s education system. Disparities in 
academic achievement are increasingly related to families’ socioeconomic differences, a problem 
that is compounded by the extensive shadow education industry in Korea. In addition, intense 
pressure to succeed academically and long hours of studying have resulted in worrisome levels 
of poor mental health among Korean students.  
In the following two chapters, I reviewed how the Korean government and the academic 
literature on Korean education policy have addressed these issues of quality (including student 
wellbeing) and equity. Since the 1950s, Korean education policy has swung back and forth from 
policies that emphasized equalization to policies that emphasized student choice as a consumer. 
Meanwhile, despite the reduction of shadow education indicated as a policy goal, the usage of 
private tutoring has remained widespread no matter where the policy pendulum swung. Korean 
scholars are divided primarily into two groups, one that supports the Korean government’s 
equalization policies, and one that supports neoliberal policies that enable students’ choices as 
consumers. There is a smaller third group of scholars that suggests searching for an even mix of 
these two kinds of policy. 
In an attempt to bring a new perspective into the story, I turned to examining education 
policy in other countries in Chapter V. Countries like China and Japan have similar education 
systems to Korea, and as a result they also have similar problems. I looked at how China and 
Japan have tried to address these problems through policy reform. Curriculum reform in 
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Shanghai to move away from practices of teaching to the test, and the Japanese yutori reform 
present some plausible policy model options for decreasing economic disparities and improving 
student mental health by reducing the competitive nature of the system. However, these have not 
been perfect solutions in their countries of origin and in the case of the yutori reform, were 
unpopular domestically. I also looked at the Nordic model, with Finland as the primary example, 
because it has been often idolized as a highly equitable and high quality education system model. 
This model demonstrated the effectiveness of comprehensive schools, excellent teaching, and 
less significance assigned to examinations. Nevertheless, because of the wider cultural gap 
between the Nordic countries and Korea, it is less clear how appropriate this model might be for 
a Korean setting. 
International policy literature related to the shadow education industry is lacking useful 
models for reducing the industry’s prevalence. In fact, Korea appears to be the leading example 
for national restrictions on private tutoring. While Korea has been the leading country in 
attempting to limit private tutoring, other countries have accepted it as a given in the education 
system and focus on regulating the commercial aspects of the industry. 
 
VI. B. Findings and Discussion 
 This paper conducted a wide scan of the issue by approaching it from multiple 
perspectives. This approach led to a better understanding of the complexity of the debate 
surrounding education policy on quality and access in Korea. It is a complicated issue that has no 
easy answers. Neither the Korean government nor the researchers of Korean education have been 
able to reach a consensus about what kind of policy is most effective for achieving an education 
system that benefits all students equally. I argue that this is likely because neither neoliberal nor 
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equity-oriented reforms have been sufficiently successful in accomplishing their policy goals of 
equity and quality, as the problems identified in Chapter II still exist.  
Furthermore, this is a common problem among countries with similar exam-oriented 
education systems and large shadow education industries. China and Japan also are struggling to 
find an overwhelmingly successful policy to address inequalities in their systems while 
maintaining quality. In Korea, Japan, and China, when the government tries to change formal 
schooling in order to decrease socioeconomic gaps or deescalate pressure on students, families 
turn from formal schooling to private tutoring to gain a competitive edge for university 
admissions. Thus the mechanism of educational inequality shifts further from the public sector 
into the private sector, where it is more difficult for the government to control. Low-income 
families, lacking the means to provide their children with the same quality and amount of private 
tutoring as high-income families, protest these kinds of reforms because they have further 
disadvantaged them. Essentially, these reforms can have a backfiring effect by inadvertently 
encouraging the use of private tutoring. They often end up giving students and their families a 
heavier burden, both financially and in terms of academic stress, as students may end up 
spending more time receiving private tutoring to compensate for the relaxed formal schooling. 
 In contrast, Finland has been comparatively successful at achieving both an equal and 
high quality education for its students. Notably, Finland has a very different educational system 
structure than Korea, Japan, and China that deemphasizes exam-based assessment, maintains a 
strong culture of trust, trains high-performing teachers, and does not utilize tracking. It should be 
noted that Finland, like the Northeast Asian states, has a college entrance exam around which the 
competition is fierce. However, Finland has successfully prevented the entire schooling process 
from becoming centered on this exam. This is because the primary and secondary school systems 
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are not structured around exam-based assessment, and because policymakers and parents trust 
teachers to educate students properly. These features of the Finnish system discourage 
competition and high-pressure learning.  
 It is perhaps telling that similarly competitive education systems face similar problems of 
inequality and student stress, while a system that deemphasizes competition has experienced 
these problems much less. I argue that countries like Japan, China, and Korea often find equity-
oriented or burden reduction reforms unsuccessful because the reforms have done little to reduce 
or eliminate the cultures of competition and education fever inherent in the structure of the 
system. It may be difficult for Korea and other countries with similar issues to effect change 
without making significant alterations to the actual structure of the education system itself. 
Korean education reform has likely not been entirely successful because it has failed to address 
the systemic roots of the problems in its education. Student mental health issues, socioeconomic 
disparities in educational opportunity, and high levels of private tutoring are symptoms of the 
high level of competition and education fever built into its high-staked exam-based system. More 
minor policy changes may be met with some success, but will likely not consequentially reduce 
targeted issues. This may be one reason as to why there has been a lack of consensus and a 
binary division among policymakers and scholars as to the correct policy approach. Because 
neither neoliberal nor equity-based policies have successfully targeted the underlying causes of 
the problems, neither type of policy has shown to be clearly more successful than the other. 
 Neoliberal policy has not been effective at achieving equitable or high quality education, 
and it is likely unable to do so in Korea because it encourages competition, rather than 
discouraging it. Although the neoliberal approach is framed around the discourse of student 
choice, it in fact limits choice for many students. Students without the financial means to pay for 
  
87 
it are unable to choose what kind of education they receive, and tend to receive a lower quality 
education than wealthier students. These students are still expected to compete in college 
admissions at the same level as wealthier students who have had more opportunity to better 
prepare for the admissions process. An education system cannot be characterized as high quality 
if many of its students do not have access to the parts of it that are high quality. Furthermore, 
neoliberal policy cannot successfully address student wellbeing because it encourages 
competition, both among schools and among students. As has been discussed above, competition 
is a major factor in contributing to Korean students’ academic stress and often pushes students to 
sacrifice sleep and leisure time for studying.  
 As discussed above, the equity-oriented policy that the Korean government has 
implemented has also not been successful because it has failed to sufficiently curtail competition 
and education fever in Korea. However, the equity-oriented policy approach is a more viable 
option for achieving educational equity and quality than the neoliberal approach. As is 
demonstrated by the Finnish school system, an equity-oriented approach can create a system that 
provides equitable and high quality education for all of its students. This kind of approach that 
discourages competition and vertical diversity allows students to enjoy learning rather than 
feeling pressured to spend a great deal of time and money trying to gain the slightest advantage. 
Critics of equity-oriented policy have accused it of promoting downward leveling and lowering 
school quality by preventing interschool and curricular diversity. In reality, allowing for 
interschool diversity tends to encourage the development of elite schools and promotes 
educational competition, rather than increasing the quality of all schools equally. However, there 
is a place in equity-oriented policy for diversity. In Finnish schools, student diversity within 
classes is encouraged and there is a great deal of curricular diversity because teachers are trusted 
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to develop their own curriculum based on the national guidelines. This kind of horizontal 
diversity allows students to learn and develop in accordance with their own particular needs and 
abilities, without allowing socioeconomic factors to determine one’s educational opportunities. 
 One of the most significant findings of this paper was the negligence of student wellbeing 
in Korean policy goals. In more recent years, some policy reforms have finally begun to address 
the extremely high levels of stress among Korean students. However, this issue had been widely 
ignored for decades. It appears that policymakers have either been paying insufficient attention 
to student wellbeing, or they have assumed this issue would be resolved through reforms that 
targeted other problems, such as socioeconomic disparities. I argue that student wellbeing 
deserves explicit attention as an indicator of educational quality and an important policy goal for 
education policymakers. Students’ mental and physical health is affected by their learning, and it 
is also affects their ability to learn effectively and happily. Korean students’ wellbeing is clearly 
being hurt by intense competition and education fever. As the head of the Seoul Metropolitan 
Office of Education, Superintendent Cho Hee-yeon, has expressed: “Good PISA scores are not 
something that South Korea should feel proud of, when they come largely by forcing children 
against their will into never-ending competition.”253 
It is important not to diminish the progress that past Korean education reform has 
achieved by making partial changes to the formal school system in order to improve equality and 
indirectly control shadow education. Students who had poorer access to private tutoring have 
been able to use publicly funded after school programs. Students have increased choice and 
minimized pressure in their education, at least during their free semester. That being said, 
expenditures on private education remain extremely high. Students still experience high stress 
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levels, in particular during the all-important final year of high school, as they prepare for the 
entrance exam and college admissions. While the quality of school curriculum may have 
improved somewhat, the existence of the college entrance exam prevents the curriculum from 
straying too far from the material that appears on the exam. Furthermore, the amount of time 
students spend studying, whether in formal school or private education, has changed little. Both 
the quality and quantity of learning is important for student health.  
 
VI. C. Tentative Policy Suggestions 
 Based on this paper’s findings, it may be useful for the Korean government to consider a 
reform that alters the structure of the education system to minimize the culture of competition 
and education fever. As has been indicated by the history of college admissions reform in Korea, 
increasing or decreasing the weight of the entrance exam score in college admissions seems to be 
mostly ineffective for reducing the culture of competition. Whether students are trying to 
improve their entrance exam score or their GPA for college admissions, those with the means 
continue to attend elite schools and utilize shadow education. However, reforms that 
deemphasize exam-based assessment in primary and secondary schools may be helpful for 
reducing student stress, socioeconomic inequities, and the prevalence of private tutoring in the 
Korean education system. This kind of reform may decrease the influence that the entrance exam 
has on the curricula, reducing the prevalence of teaching to the test. It may also lessen 
competition-based student stress. This type of reform would likely require significant resources 
to rework the curriculum and methods of student assessment in primary and secondary schools. 
It would also likely require guidelines and training for schools and teachers to readjust to the new 
system, as most educators are only familiar with test-based assessment and teaching. The 
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government would also need to monitor schools to ensure that the new system is not being 
manipulated. The new system may make teachers more susceptible to pressure or bribery to 
improve students grades, as methods of assessment that do not utilize exams are often more 
subjective than test-based assessment.  
 It may also be beneficial to return to equalization policies that reduce interschool 
diversity among middle and high schools. Programs like the SPHS that allow school choice 
encourage the ranking of schools and limit access to high-ranking schools based on 
socioeconomic status. Instead of interschool diversity, student diversity in classes and curricular 
diversity should be encouraged. In other words, policy reforms that encourage horizontal 
diversity might effectively improve school quality without exacerbating inequities. Student 
tracking policies should be eliminated to allow for more classroom diversity and teachers should 
be allowed more flexibility in tailoring the national curriculum to students’ particular needs and 
abilities. 
Entirely eliminating the entrance exam is likely not a viable policy reform. As evidenced 
by the experience of Sweden, doing so tends to create new problems for a fair admissions 
process. Furthermore, removing the entrance exam would require substantial resources to 
redesign the admissions process and would undoubtedly be met with significant backlash from 
the public, as the exam is seen as a necessary evil and the most objective way to determine 
university admissions. It is notable that even Finland, the example of a low-competition and low-
stress education system, has a college entrance exam. This suggests that such a dramatic reform 
may not be ideal. 
The findings of this paper also suggest that direct government control of private tutoring 
is an unsuccessful form of policy. The total ban under an authoritarian government minimized 
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the industry but still produced a black market of private tutoring. A renewed total ban under 
South Korea’s current democratic regime would undoubtedly not be supported, as indicated by 
the ban’s ruling as unconstitutional in 2000. Current attempts to control private academies 
through curfews have met backlash and have proved difficult to enforce. It is unlikely that Korea 
would return to an outright ban on private tutoring, and doing so would likely not be effective at 
mitigating the problems within Korean education. If the education system moves away from 
exam-based assessment and a culture of competition, demand for private tutoring should 
decrease and the shadow education industry should contract as a result. That being said, 
maintaining tutoring center curfew policies until any future policy reforms, despite the difficulty 
of enforcing the curfew, is in the interest of student wellbeing. 
 Another way of reducing the competition focused around the entrance exam may be to 
create policy that facilitates a culture of trust between educators, families, and the government. 
In Finland, despite the existence of a competitive college entrance exam, shadow education is not 
a problem and student stress is low. The curricula taught in schools is perceived as good quality, 
and teachers are able to maintain integrity in their teaching without being pressured to prepare 
students only for the entrance exam. This is because parents and the government trust that 
educators know what is best for their students. If the Korean government was able to develop 
and implement policy that encourages a similar culture of trust for educators, that may also 
minimize competition and student stress in the education system without changing the structure 
of the entrance exam and university admissions process. In addition, reforms that facilitated 
teacher trust would supplement reforms that deemphasize exam-based assessment in schools by 
discouraging parental doubt of teachers’ evaluations of their children. This kind of reform may 
also play an important role in discouraging families from turning to shadow education because 
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they find formal schooling insufficient. 
 Policy reforms that reduce competition and education fever would likely improve student 
wellbeing by decreasing students’ academic pressures and allowing more sleep and leisure time. 
However, even if these policy reforms are not enacted, it may be beneficial to develop policy 
reforms specifically targeting student mental and physical health. Creating guidelines for the 
development of more extensive counseling services or student welfare teams in school, similar to 
the practices found in Finland, may help address students who are struggling. Developing 
programs to present in schools that educate students on how to handle academic stress may also 
be helpful. In addition, existing policies that temporarily reduce academic pressures on students, 
such as the Free Semester Program, may be expanded to give students more time in school free 
of stress to prevent burnout. 
 
VI. D. Avenues for Further Research 
 There are two topics in particular that fell outside of the scope of this paper that would be 
illuminating subjects for further research. The first is the role teacher training and education has 
to play in creating classrooms free from stress and inequality. The standard of education for 
teachers in Finland is high, and as a result Finnish teachers are well equipped to teach students of 
varying abilities and backgrounds. Finnish teachers are trusted both by policymakers and parents 
to produce their own curriculum based on the national guidelines. Further research might 
examine the situation of teacher training, as well as teacher motivation, in Korea to see whether 
it plays a role in their preparedness to teach the curriculum no matter the student’s skill level. It 
might also provide some insight into the public’s perception of teachers in formal schools and 
why so many parents feel it necessary to send their children to private tutoring. 
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 This relates to the second topic in need of further research, the role of parental 
perceptions and the societal norms of competitive academics and private tutoring in Korea. 
Although some research has been done on these topics, it may prove useful to investigate the 
relationship between these issues and education policy.254 Parents’ perceptions about the need for 
private tutoring may stem from their perceptions of the quality of teachers and teaching in formal 
schools. Their perceptions may also be influenced by societal norms about the necessity or 
universality of receiving private tutoring. These factors could influence the effectiveness of 
education reform intended to improve formal schooling or reduce the shadow education industry. 
Some scholars say that the government will be unable to minimize shadow education because 
education fever “seems to be a constant rather than a variable that is subject to the effects of 
policy responses.”255 However, this narrative should be questioned. Further studying the 
relationship between education policy and public perceptions in Korea may reveal possible ways 
for the government to reshape the culture of competition and education fever. Creating policy 
that facilitates a trust of teachers may be one pathway toward this reshaping. The Korean 
government will need to explore many options to reach a consensus about what type of policy is 
most successful at achieving a balance of excellence and equity in education and producing high-
performing, healthy, happy students. 
 This summer I will be moving to Korea to teach English as a second language with the 
Fulbright program. This paper has generated insight that will help me better understand the 
education system in which I will work, as well as the students I will teach. This insight will 
                                                
254 Hongjoo Woo and Nancy N. Hodges, “Education Fever: Exploring Private Education Consumption Motivations 
Among Korean Parents of Preschool Children,” Family and Consumer Sciences Research Journal 44, no. 2 (2015): 
127–42, https://doi.org/10.1111/fcsr.12131; Park, “Education Manager Mothers: South Korea’s Neoliberal 
Transformation”; Yang and Shin, “Parental Attitudes towards Education: What Matters for Children’s Well-
Being?”; Lee and Shouse, “The Impact of Prestige Orientation on Shadow Education in South Korea.” 
255 Lee, Lee, and Jang, “The History of Policy Responses to Shadow Education in South Korea: Implications for the 
next Cycle of Policy Responses,” 105. 
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enable me to be a more thoughtful teacher and coworker. While in Korea, I hope to expand on 
this paper by exploring the opinions of students, parents, and teachers regarding their educational 
experiences as well as their preferences regarding education policy. This would supplement the 
research done in this paper by giving a voice not only to scholars, but also to the individuals who 
are directly affected by current changes in policy. 
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